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ABSTRACT 
After the attacks on the United States in September 2001, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina acquired a reputation as a country supporting international terrorism.  This 
perception was mostly a result of the 1992–1995 war, when foreign fighters tied to 
Islamist terrorist groups came to support the Bosniaks and spread radical Islam. 
The thesis investigates three theories about the development or support of terrorist 
networks and the radicalization of society.  The thesis assesses each theory’s explanatory 
power in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
The main research findings include the following.  Islamist vanguards have 
succeeded in attracting some young Bosniaks who abandoned their traditional beliefs, 
accepted more a puritan and less tolerant form of Islam, and became potential manpower 
for Islamist extremists.  Constant political confrontations among Bosnia and Herzegovina 
politicians representing different ethnic groups have led to political instability.  The 
country has neither the coercive nor the administrative capacities to provide a safe and 
stable environment, permitting the development of terrorist cells and affiliates.  Even 
though Bosnia and Herzegovina has a permissive environment where extremist 
vanguards promote radical ideologies and call for jihad, the Muslim population generally 
does not support these groups or extremist violence. 
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The purpose of this thesis is to explain the relative weakness of the Islamist 
terrorist networks in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and lack of supportiveness of Bosniaks for 
Islamic radicalism.  The research has further importance in explaining the eventual 
vulnerability of Bosnia and Herzegovina Muslims to the Islamist ideology that might 
possibly lead to the creation of Bosnia and Herzegovina terrorist cells or affiliates.  Better 
understanding of these issues can find practical application to minimize the spread of 
radical ideology among the Muslim population.  In addition, a better understanding of the 
development of Islamic radicalism is a good basis for discussion or argument for the need 
to help countries that are potential hosts for terrorist groups by improving their 
counterterrorist measures.  The fight against terrorists is a worldwide issue, and carefully 
considering the problems of a small country such as Bosnia and Herzegovina can have a 
positive effect on global security. 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
Bosnia and Herzegovina is a small multinational European country with a short 
but very difficult and complicated history.  The country became independent in 1992, at 
the beginning of what was to become a four-year civil war.  The war ended on December 
14, 1995, when domestic political leaders, mediated by representatives of the 
international community, signed the General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP), 
better known as Dayton Peace Agreement.  The international community and the Bosnia 
and Herzegovina government have accepted responsibility to stop hostilities, build trust 
between belligerent parties, and provide a safe, stable environment based on rule of law 
and democratic principles.  The Dayton agreement defines Bosnia and Herzegovina as a 
democratic state, which consists of the two Entities, the Federation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and the Republic of Srpska.1 
                                                 
1 “General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” Annex 4, Articles 2 and 3. 
(Dayton, Ohio, December 14, 1995). 
 2
Following the terrorist attacks on the United States in September 2001, many 
international officials declared that Bosnia and Herzegovina provided safe haven for 
Islamist terrorists, mainly because of the Islamic fighters who came to support Bosniaks 
in the 1992–1995 war.  The exact number of these foreign fighters is unknown, and most 
sources present conflicting numbers, which range from a few hundred to several thousand 
people.  For instance, Stephen Schwartz operates with a large number, suggesting that 
6000 foreign fighters came to Bosnia and Herzegovina.2  After the war, most of the 
foreign fighters left the country, but some remained to live as citizens in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.  According to E. Kostantinova, “All had obtained Bosnian citizenship 
through marriage or in recognition of their role in the war.  About 200 of them remain in 
Bosnia, many of who[m] [are] suspected of having links to Bin Laden’s al-Qa’ida 
network and other terrorist groups.”3  These foreigners, it is often suggested, brought with 
them a radical Islamic ideology that they have been trying to spread among the Bosnia 
and Herzegovina Muslims since their arrival.  
The report of the International Crisis Group for 2001 stated that Bosnia and 
Herzegovina has become a very attractive place for Islamist terrorists to establish 
networks because of the large Muslim population, weak state institutions, weak economy 
and poor social conditions.4  Therefore, it could be expected that the country’s recent 
independence, civil war, arrival of foreign fighters, high level of poverty, and other 
factors would lead to the development of terrorist cells and affiliates.  This is not the case.  
The U. S. Congressional Research Service in 2005 stated that many experts on the issue 
do not see the country as a key region for harboring or funding terrorists.5  Also, Petter 
Nesser’s chronology of attempted and executed terrorist attacks by Islamist extremists in 
                                                 
2 Stephen Schwartz, “Wahhabism and al-Qaeda in Bosnia-Herzegovina,” Terrorism Monitor 2, no. 20 
(October 21, 2004), http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_ cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=27034 (accessed 
January 22, 2009). 
3 E. Kostantinova, “Special Report: Al-Qa’ida in the Balkans, is it there or isn’t it?” Jane’s Islamic 
Affairs Analyst (March 28, 2002).  
4 International Crisis Group, “Bin Laden and the Balkans: The Politics of Anti-Terrorism,” ICG 
Balkans Report no. 119 (November 9, 2001), 2. http://se2.isn.ch/serviceengine/FileContent?serviceID= 
10&fileid=385DC0AF-E1A0-CF33-A7FF-C0F65D7317C2&lng=en/ (accessed January 22, 2009). 
5 Steven Woehrel, “Islamic Terrorism and Balkans,” CRS Report for Congress (July 26, 2005), 1. 
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Europe from 1994 to 2007 shows that Bosniaks were involved in less than three percent 
of those incidents, and in no cases involving direct execution of terrorist acts.  Indeed, 
they were only suspected of terrorist activities.6 
Among the many theories explaining the origins of insurgent violence, the three 
theories most often posited as explanations of how terrorism emerges and spreads are the 
theory of socio-political grievances, the ideological theory, and the permissive state 
theory.  The question is, what does the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina tell us about the 
explanatory power of these theories?  Can these theories explain the relative weakness of 
Islamist terrorist networks in Bosnia? 
B. HYPOTHESES 
To answer these questions, the thesis investigates the three main theories that 
define the roots and necessary conditions for developing or supporting terrorist networks 
and radicalizing a society, and discusses their applicability in the case of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. 
The theory of socio-political grievances claims that terrorism is a direct 
consequence of grievances caused by foreign policies and domestic or foreign conflicts.  
Politically excluded masses are galvanized and adopt violence as a means to bring issues 
to the attention of the international community or to destabilize domestic or foreign 
enemies.7 
The ideological theory claims that terrorism is motivated by extreme 
interpretations of religious traditions, doctrines and sacred texts, where violence toward 
real or perceived enemies is justified as a holy duty.8 
                                                 
6 Petter Nesser, “Chronology of Jihadism in Western Europe 1994–2007: Planned, Prepared, and 
Executed Terrorist Attacks,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, no. 31 (2008): 924–946. 
7 Petter Nesser, “Jihadism in Western Europe After the Invasion of Iraq: Tracing Motivational 
Influences from the Iraq War on Jihadist Terrorism in Western Europe,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 
29, no. 4 (June 2006): 323–342. 
8 David C. Rapoport, “Sacred terror: A contemporary example from Islam,” in Origins of Terrorism, 
ed. Walter Reich (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1998), 103–130. 
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The permissive state theory claims that weak or failing states produce conditions 
attractive for establishing international terrorist networks and recruiting new followers 
because of their political instability and their coercive and administrative incapacity.9 
C. IMPORTANCE 
Radical Islam is an increasing concern among the world’s population, and no 
country with a Muslim population is immune to this issue.  Bosnia and Herzegovina is 
one of the countries where radical Islamic elements are present.  Radical Islam has been 
evolving slowly but steadily.10  If radical Islam becomes more accepted by the Bosniak 
population, there is a greater chance that some radicalized Muslims would be recruited by 
Islamist terrorist organizations.  As a consequence of radicalization, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina could easily lose its chance to become a stable country and thus would 
forever remain in the “lobby” of the European community, never achieving the 
conditions necessary for membership in the European Union. 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
1. General 
Islamism is “a radical anti-secular and anti-Western political current of 
contemporary Islamic thought with both revolutionary and revivalist character.”11  The 
major characteristics of the Islamism are a virulent rejection of secular democratic values, 
intransigent resistance to any “infidel” social, political, economic or cultural influences 
over the Muslim world, an extreme hostility toward less committed and non-militant 
Muslims (who are often labeled as “apostates” or “unbelievers”) and a demand for the 
creation of an Islamic state, or Islamic order, governed by a strict, puritanical 
                                                 
9 James A. Piazza, “Incubators of Terror: Do Failed and Failing States Promote Transnational 
Terrorism?” International Studies Quarterly 52, no. 3 (September 1, 2008): 469. 
10 Sara Babic, “Bosni prijeti opasnost of Vehabista,” Nacional, no. 561, August 14, 2006. 
http://www.nacional.hr/clanak/27003/bosni-prijeti-opasnost-od-vehabista/ (accessed January 22, 2009). 
11 Jeffrey Bale, “Islamism,” in Encyclopedia of Bioterrorism Defense, ed. Ricahrd F. Pilch and 
Raymond A Zilinskas (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley and Sons, 2005), 296. 
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interpretation of Islam.12  There are two subgroups of Islamism, gradualist and jihadist.  
The main distinction between the two is how they achieve their ideological goals.  
Generally, gradualists’ approach is based on the Islamization of society by educating 
Muslims about Islam, influencing their consciousness, and infiltrating and Islamizing 
state institutions.  Although gradualists can establish secret armed groups, the violent 
approach is more common among jihadists, who “advocate the waging of jihad, in the 
sense of an armed struggle against unbelievers (kuffar).”13  While the two subcategories 
differ in strategy, they both consider radicalization of the society as a necessary first step 
to achieve their objectives.  According to the definition given by Netherland General 
Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD), radicalization is 
the (active) pursuit of and/or support to far-reaching changes in society 
which may constitute a danger to (the continued existence of) the 
democratic legal order (aim), which may involve the use of undemocratic 
methods (means) that may harm the functioning of the democratic legal 
order (effect).14 
While not inevitable, it is possible that the radicalization process will result in 
extremist violence.  There is a small and yet important distinction between radicalization 
and extremist violence; small because the radicalization can result in extremist violence, 
and important because some radicals never adopt violence as a strategy for accomplishing 
their objectives.  Understanding terrorism is not possible without an understanding of the 
process of radicalization. 
Scholars disagree on the origins of terrorism.  Some find the roots of terrorism in 
political, socioeconomic, or religious dimensions, while others propose alternate views.  
The most relevant theories for the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina are the theory of 
socio–political grievances, the theory that terrorism is motivated by religion, and the 
theory that state permissiveness allows the growth of terrorist elements. 
                                                 
12 Bale, 296–298. 
13 Ibid., 297. 
14 AIVD: General Intelligence and Security Service, From Dawa to Jihad, December 2004, 14. 
http://www.minbzk.nl/contents/pages/42345/fromdawatojihad.pdf (accessed June 28, 2009). 
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2. Theory of Socio-Political Grievances 
The theory of socio-political grievances states that grievances caused by internal 
or external factors alienate the population from the status quo.  In attempting to bring the 
issue to the attention of the responsible authorities, the alienated masses, manipulated by 
radical vanguards, sometimes decide to use violence as a means of communication. 
While some scholars uphold the theory that external influences cause 
radicalization, others relate radicalization to the issues caused by internal conflict and 
post conflict injustice.  Gabriel Sheffer argues that diasporas and “other” groups are more 
likely to support terrorism, where “others” include anti-globalists, refugees, internally 
displaced persons, asylum seekers, newly arrived migrants, organized trans–state ethno-
national diasporas, and cultural and religious transnational dispersals.  Support for 
violence can be motivated by expulsion from one’s country of origin, struggles for 
separation and independence, discrimination, and legal and political persecution.15  
However, political grievances alone do not cause people to advocate violence as a means 
of communication.  According to Mohammed M. Hafez, “the absence of institutional 
channels for conflict mediation and political contestation encourages rebellion by 
delegitimizing the ruling regime and disempowering moderate voices within the 
movement.”16  Socio-political grievances together with political blockages increase the 
likelihood of political violence. 
The theory of socio-political grievances implies that the grievances of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina Bosniaks developed as a result of international and American foreign 
policies toward themselves or other nations with whom Bosniaks identify.  Grievances 
associated with the civil war alienate some Bosniaks.  Lacking domestic political 
channels to express their grievances in Bosnia and Herzegovina, dissatisfied Bosniaks 
become more prone to adopting violence as a means of drawing attention to their issues. 
                                                 
15 Gabriel Sheffer, “Diasporas and Terrorism,” in The Roots of Terrorism, ed. Louise Richardson, 
(New York: Routledge, 2006), 117–129. 
16 Mohammed M. Hafez, Why Muslims Rebel (Colorado, Lynne Rienner Publisher, 2003), 27. 
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3. Terrorism Motivated by Religion 
Many scholars argue that religion plays a role in initiating extremist violence; 
indeed religion is more often used to give violence a sacred dimension and justify it as a 
fight between good and evil.  Mark Juergensmeyer argues that “religious language and 
ideas play an important role [in religious violence] but not necessarily the initial one.”17  
However, in analyzing different religious extremist groups, Juergensmeyer discovers 
several common ideological components.  First, there is “the perception that the modern 
idea of secular nationalism was insufficient in moral, political, and social terms.”  
Second, all group members “felt personally upset with what they regarded as the 
oppression of the secular state.”  Finally, all of them justify violence by the idea of 
cosmic war.18  Even if religion is mostly used to justify or intensify violence initially 
caused by social, economic and political factors, there is still room to argue that some 
religious extremist groups base their violence on theological motivations, attempting to 
establish a new order inspired by sacred text. 
Extremism can be found in any religion, but Islamist extremism is the most 
recent.  Islamist extremists see waging jihad against unbelievers as an obligation of every 
Muslim.  This war, they believe, started in the time of Muhammad, and will end when all 
those who reject Islam are either converted or killed.  The conflict between Islamist 
extremists and everybody who does not share their ideology already exists.  Their 
strategy for achieving their objectives depends upon their strength and having a 
supportive environment.  It can vary from extremists acting as gradualists who educate 
the population about Islam, to establishing secret armed groups, to open confrontation 
with the enemy.  Susanna Pearce says that religious doctrines, religious organizations, 
and a religious diasporas correlate directly with the intensity of the religious conflicts.19   
 
                                                 
17 Mark Juergemsmeyer, “Religion as a Cause of Terrorism,” in The Roots of Terrorism, ed. Louise 
Richardson (New York: Routledge, 2006), 139. 
18 Juergemsmeyer, 140–141. 
19 Susanna Pearce, “Religious Sources of Violence,” in The Making of a Terrorist: Recruitment, 
Training, and Root Causes, Volume III: Root Causes, ed. James J. F. Forest (London: Greenwood 
Publishing Group, 2006), 111. 
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Keeping in mind that Islamist extremists can exist on the margins of almost any society, 
these three elements can be considered factors that influence their strength and societal 
acceptance. 
The rise of Islamist extremists in Bosnia and Herzegovina would be expected if 
marginalized elements, supported by internal or external players, successfully 
indoctrinate the masses and recruit followers and supporters from among the newly-
radicalized Muslims.  In this case, the country would have the potential to serve as an 
Islamist extremist sanctuary. 
4. Theory of Permissive Environment 
Permissive environments for the rise of terrorism are primarily related to weak 
state institutions that are incapable and ineffective at performing their duties.  According 
to Erica Chenoweth, “[P]olitical stability of the existing regime is the most significant 
factor affecting the origins of terrorism.”20  Chenoweth argues that because of their 
negative impact on state institutional mechanisms, politically unstable regimes are more 
likely than stable regimes to provide permissive environments where terrorist 
organizations can develop.21  There are four basic categories defining the strength of a 
state: strong, weak, failed and collapsed.  The strength of the state is determined by its 
ability to deliver political goods to its citizens.  Political goods include human security, 
prevention of cross border threats and domestic crime, mechanisms for citizens to resolve 
disagreements, rule of law, ways for citizens to participate in politics and political 
processes, education, medical and health care systems, physical and communications 
infrastructure, banking systems, and the promotion of civil society.22  The state’s ability 
to provide such goods is directly influenced by the stability of the political system.  James 
A. Piazza relates state weakness to the inability to project power throughout its own 
territory; such states are under constant threat of civil war, secession and internal power 
                                                 
20 Erica Chenoweth, “Instability and Opportunity: The Origins of Terrorism in Weak and Failed 
States,” in The Making of a Terrorist: Recruitment, Training, and Root Causes, Volume III: Root Causes, 
ed. James J. F. Forest (London: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2006), 17. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid., 18–19. 
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struggles.  In addition, weak states cannot provide basic security, economic stability, 
effective bureaucracy or judicial institutions.23  Therefore, weak and failed states are 
more likely to host terrorist groups, are more often under terrorist attack, provide more 
new recruits for terrorist groups, and are more attractive environments for establishing 
bases from which terrorists can operate abroad.24 
The theory of permissive environment fits the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina if 
it is assumed that the constant confrontations among Bosnia and Herzegovina politicians 
erodes state institutions and the mechanisms for providing basic goods to citizens.  As a 
result, the state would be unable to efficiently control its borders or its entire territory, the 
level of corruption would be very high, bureaucracy would slow and ineffective.  The 
country would be economically unstable and the rule of law would not be effective.  With 
political elements supporting radical ideologies, Bosnia and Herzegovina might be seen 
as a country that provides space for terrorist vanguards to recruit new followers and 
establish bases from which they can operate abroad. 
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
This thesis is a case study of Bosnia and Herzegovina and its Muslim population 
in relation to Islamist terrorism.  To answer the research question, the thesis investigates 
three hypotheses about the development of or support for terrorist organizations and the 
radicalization of society in order to determine which approach best explains the absence 
of Islamic radicalism in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
Although many scholars have written about Bosnia and Herzegovina and the war 
in the early 1990s, only few describe the recent situation in the country with regard to 
terrorist activities and the spread of Islamic radicalism. 
Furthermore, Bosnia and Herzegovina’s capabilities for electronically published 
journals and other publications are still very limited.  Recent scholarly works are only 
partially available.  In addition, the academic behavior of local scholars is an important 
                                                 
23 Piazza, 470. 
24 Ibid., 471. 
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consideration.  Some literature is very biased and contains nationalist rhetoric.  
Therefore, use of local sources is a sensitive matter requiring an impartial and 
unemotional approach to gathering information.  However, consideration of local 
sources, with their inside information and perspectives, is necessary for a full 
understanding of the situation. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
Chapter I provides a brief background on the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
with regard to Islamic radicalism and terrorism and presents several hypotheses about the 
roots of terrorism.  Each hypothesis is supported by various scholars.  The chapter 
describes what each theory means in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina.  Chapter I also 
discusses the methodology of the thesis research and the importance of an impartial and 
unbiased approach to sources. 
Chapter II tests the theory that internal and external political factors cause 
insurgent violence.  The first factor is related to the creation of the grievances among the 
Muslim population by foreign policies toward Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina or in 
other countries.  The internal factors mainly involve the consequences of the war on 
relations among different ethnic groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the eventual 
development of grievances among Bosniaks.  Bosniaks, the majority of the Bosnia and 
Herzegovina population, have to share power equally with Croats and Serbs.  Their 
grievances could be caused by the post-war distribution of power based on the size of the 
ethnic group, with concurrent power-sharing equality among the three majority ethnic 
groups.  In addition, the return of the Bosniaks expelled during the war by Serbs or 
Croats has been very slow and difficult.  Together with slow post-conflict justice, the 
distribution of power could cause Bosniaks to turn to a radical approach in seeking for 
justice or even revenge.  Fortunately, there is no political party or strong self-organized 
group with an extremist ideology that might manipulate the alienated Bosniaks, organize 
armed groups and try to resolve the current issues with violence.  The Bosniaks are still 
waiting patiently for their problems to be resolved by legal and peaceful means through 
the country’s democratic institutions. 
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Chapter III discusses a religious explanation of insurgency and the spread of 
radical Islam among Bosnia and Herzegovina Muslims.  The radical ideology came to 
Bosnia and Herzegovina with Islamic foreign fighters and humanitarian organizations.  
Some donors from Islamic countries built religious facilities that preach a version of 
Islam quite different from that normally heard by moderate Bosniaks.  Facing a religious 
revival after living in a communist regime for half a century, and in search of a national 
identity, some Bosnia and Herzegovina Muslims became vulnerable to imported 
ideologies.  Guided by radicals from the Middle East and southwest Asia, radicalized 
Bosniaks became promoters of Islamism.  To convey their message and attract more 
followers, the radicalized Bosniaks created many Web sites promoting jihad and anti-
Western ideology.  In addition, several organizations, mostly consisting of young people, 
have tried to convince moderate Bosniaks to abandon their traditional Islamic practice, 
characterized as corrupted and deviant, and adopt a puritanical and uncorrupted form of 
Islam as practiced by the prophet Muhammad.  The Bosniak population has been 
manipulated not only by foreign elements, but also by insiders who have taken advantage 
of the public’s vulnerability during its search for a national identity.  Encouraging 
adherence to religious and cultural practices that differ from those practiced by moderate 
Bosnia and Herzegovina Muslims, these insiders try to make visible the differences 
between Bosniaks and other ethnic groups in order to separate the Muslims and make 
them more vulnerable to manipulation.  Alienated Muslims have been used as a tool to 
achieve various political and personal agendas under the guise of national identity and 
religion.  Some of the most recent incidents involving radicalized young Bosniaks are 
described in this chapter. 
Chapter IV tests the theory that weak states produce conditions attractive for 
establishing international terrorist networks and recruiting new followers.  The purpose of 
the chapter is to describe conditions in Bosnia and Herzegovina and determine if the 
country has permissive environment for establishing or supporting Islamic radicals and 
terrorist groups.  As a result of the war, the country’s social, economic and political 
capacities have been so devastated that the country has for years been a weak state.  The 
county is characterized as politically unstable due to constant political confrontations 
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between a few of the most important politicians representing different ethnic groups whose 
rhetoric is not supportive of the Bosnia and Herzegovina multiethnic environment.  Lacking 
unity within the political elite, the country has faced negative consequences for years, which 
are evident in its poor coercive and administrative capabilities.  Corruption is everywhere.  
Security institutions, incapable or ignorant of how to deal with destabilizing elements, are 
directly or indirectly responsible for the permissive environment.  The chapter reviews the 
Bosniak political elite’s support of the inflow of radicalism, their past attempts to create an 
Islamic state of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and their existence in political, religious and most 
other spheres of the Bosnia and Herzegovina society today.  The chapter provides a better 
understanding of why Bosnia and Herzegovina is facing destabilizing elements even in 
the nearly fifteen years after the end of the war. 
The thesis concludes with Chapter V, which argues that Islamic radicals have 
found weak support among the Bosnia and Herzegovina Bosniak population.  Even with 
many of the necessary conditions for the development of Islamist extremism, most Bosniaks 
do not support radical Islam and the radical influences from other Islamic countries.  The 
Bosniak population seems unwilling to abandon its traditional moderate Islamic practices and 
has not adopted violent strategies to satisfy its grievances.  It seems that all the theories on 
the origins of terrorism discussed in the thesis fail in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina.  
Analysis of societies similar to Bosnia and Herzegovina should perhaps start by considering 
why some societies are not supportive of radicalization and extremist violence.  For further 
research, the most important variables influencing Bosnia and Herzegovina Muslims’ lack 
of support for radical ideologies and Islamist terrorism probably include prolonged 
coexistence with other religious groups, high literacy rates, the practice of moderate 
Islam, belief in and support for democratic values, and a sense of belonging to an area in 
which people share common values. 
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II. TERRORISM ROOTED IN SOCIO-POLITICAL GRIEVANCES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
One theory defining the roots of terrorism is the theory of socio-political 
grievances.  The theory of socio-political grievances says that terrorism is a direct 
consequence of grievances caused by foreign policies and domestic or foreign conflicts 
where, due to political exclusion, galvanized masses adopt violence as a means to gain 
the attention of the international community or to destabilize foreign or domestic 
elements supporting the enemy.25 
The theory of socio-political grievances implies that some of the Bosniak 
population would develop grievances in response to the policies of the international 
community and the United States toward Bosnia and Herzegovina and other nations or 
ethnic groups with whom Bosniaks identify, and also as a consequence of the 1992–1995 
war among the Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats.  Their inability to participate in the political 
system and bring these issues to the attention of responsible authorities could cause some 
Bosniaks to become too alienated.  Manipulated by extremist vanguards, they might turn 
to violence as a means of communication. 
This chapter discusses the grievances caused by external and internal factors that 
could eventually lead to the radicalization of a majority of the Bosniak population, the 
existence of counter-elite elements who could become armed elements of political parties 
or vanguards of terrorist organizations, and the openness of the Bosnia and Herzegovina 
political system. 
B. EXTERNAL FACTORS 
1. Foreign Policies Toward Bosnia and Herzegovina Muslims 
The Former Yugoslavia greeted the 1990s with tensions among its ethnic groups.  
The level of tension was so high that it was obvious that disagreements and the secession 
                                                 
25 Nesser, “Jihadism in Western Europe after the Invasion of Iraq.” 
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of the Yugoslav republics would not proceed peacefully.  The secession of Slovenia in 
June 1991 ended with ten-day war.  Attempts by Croatia to secede ended in the 
occupation of more than a third of its territory by Serbs supported by the Yugoslavian 
People’s Army (YPA). 
On Sept. 25, 1991, the United Nations [UN] imposed an arms embargo on 
the former Yugoslavia for the ostensible purpose of promoting peace and 
security in the Balkans.  But for over three-and-a-half years the embargo 
has failed to achieve its objectives.  Instead, it has made possible ethnic 
cleansing, genocide and the dismantling of a member state of the UN.26 
In Bosnia and Herzegovina alone, during the 1992–1995 war, about 100,000 
people were killed, tens of thousands of women were raped, many prisoners of war were 
mistreated, and more than two million people were displaced.  Bosniaks suffered most of 
the casualties.  “An UN-imposed arms embargo guaranteed that a well-armed Serbia 
could annex territory and expel over a million civilians while facing only limited 
resistance.”27  The Bosniaks and Croats at the beginning of the war were unarmed and 
unprepared, while the Bosnia and Herzegovina Serbs were well armed, equipped, and 
well organized. 
The Bosnia and Herzegovina Serbs controlled weaponry belonging to the YPA 
and received assistance from neighboring Serbia.  Most of the commanding cadres of the 
Serb forces were the YPA career officers, well trained and organized.  Bosnia and 
Herzegovina Croats turned to their second motherland, Croatia, which sent them aid.  
Only the Bosniaks had no one to turn to.  When the international community, particularly 
the United Nations and United States, failed to stop the conflict and the suffering of 
innocent victims, the Bosniaks had good reason to feel abandoned.  There are many 
theories explaining the wavering policy of the UN and U.S. toward the war in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, but one is especially interesting.  Paul R. Pillar says, 
                                                 
26 Paul R. Williams, “Why the Bosnian Arms Embargo Is Illegal,” Public International Law and 
Policy Group (June 15, 1995), http://www.publicinternationallaw.org/publications/editorials/Bosnian% 
20Arms%20Embargo.htm (accessed April 10, 2009). 
27 Rabia Ali and Lawrence Lifschultz, “Why Bosnia?” Third World Quarterly 15, no. 3 (September 
1994), 369. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3993291 (accessed August 17, 2009). 
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Many critics believe the United States pursues policies that hurt the 
interests of Muslims not just because this is an unfortunate by-product of 
foreign policies formulated for other reasons, but because the United 
States wants to hurt Muslims.  Some even believed that Washington kept 
aloof from the Bosnian war as long as it did because it was happy to see 
Serbs kill off Muslims.28 
When Robert Fisk made his journey to Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1993, several 
Bosniaks, officials and ordinary people alike, expressed their opinion about the 
international community’s lack of interest in Bosnia and Herzegovina, saying they felt 
abandoned.  They said they did not blame the international community and the U.S. for 
failing to prevent the conflict, but for failing to stop it.29  Years later, radicalized 
Bosniaks still blame the U.S. not only for not stopping the war, but also for stopping it 
when Muslim forces became strong enough to win. 
The U.S. did help the Muslims by imposing sanctions on their principal 
enemy, the Serbs, and hitting Serb positions with air strikes toward the end 
of the war.  But Islamists argue that when Washington intervened with a 
peace settlement after Muslim troops overran Serb lines, the move was 
designed to abort a probable Muslim victory.30 
2. Foreign Policies Toward Worldwide Muslim Communities 
Paul R. Pillar says that “a superpower’s foreign policy matters to the would–be 
terrorist insofar as he (or she) sees it as affecting either his immediate daily life and 
welfare or a larger community—usually one defined in terms of religion or ethnicity—
from which he derives his identity.”31  According to his theory, the external factors that 
could produce grievances in Bosnia and Herzegovina might be related to ongoing 
conflicts between Muslims and non-Muslims in the Middle East. 
                                                 
28 Paul R. Pillar, “Superpower Foreign Policies: A Source for Global Resentment,” in The Making of a 
Terrorist: Recruitment, Training, and Root Causes, Volume III: Root Causes, ed. James J. F. Forest 
(Greenwood Publishing Group, 2006), 37. 
29 Beirut to Bosnia: Part III, written and presented by Robert Fisk, directed by Michael Dutfield, 
Discovery Channel Production, 1994, documentary film. 
30 Yaroslav Trofimov, “Seeds of Hate: In Postwar Bosnia, Militant Islam Turns U.S. Allies to 
Enemies,” Wall Street Journal, March 18, 2002, Eastern Edition, 
http://www.proquest.com.libproxy.nps.edu (accessed August 17, 2009).  
31 Pillar, 33–34. 
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The interest in happenings among the worldwide Muslim community was not 
always present among the Bosniak population, at least not at the scale seen today.  The 
war in Bosnia and Herzegovina strengthened relations between Bosniaks and other 
Muslim societies, especially those in the Middle East.  With the failure of the 
international community to protect them, and lacking assistance from other countries, the 
Bosniak population barely survived the war.  The Bosniak political elite, lead by Alija 
Izetbegovic, seized the opportunity to strengthen relations with Islamic countries and ask 
for help.  Very quickly, support in the form of weaponry and manpower started arriving 
in the country.  The real reasons why some Islamic countries so eagerly assisted Bosniaks 
remain unclear.  While many Bosniaks believe that Muslims’ humane sensitivity toward 
those in need is the only reason why Islamic countries were eager to assist, others believe 
that beyond the humanitarian concern is an attempt to create an Islamic state in Europe 
and spread their own influence on European soil. 
Either way, it was the beginning of a new friendship between Bosnia and 
Herzegovina Muslims and worldwide Muslim communities.  Since then, the Bosniaks 
have seen some of these as kin countries, always ready to offer help.  As a result, some 
Bosniaks have come to identify themselves with Muslims from around the world.  This 
identification is especially evident with regard to the Palestinian-Israeli issue and Israeli 
operations against Palestinian insurgents that have killed civilians, women and children 
more often than militants. 
The Palestinian question is a sore point in the hearts of the vast majority of 
Muslims.  The injustice to the people of Palestine, with the dissolution and 
occupation of their country, and the daily humiliation that Palestinians 
experience in their country, awaken deep emotions, not only in the Arab 
world, but also on every corner where Muslims live, and–not to be 
forgotten–a great number non-Muslims.32 
Some Bosniaks identify their suffering during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
with the sufferings of Muslims in the Middle East.  The Bosniaks represent 66.11 percent 
of the total casualties from the Bosnia and Herzegovina war, of which 40 percent were 
                                                 
32 Emir Sinanovic, “Drustveno-politicka strujanja u modernom islamskom svijetu,” Bosanski alim, 
http://www.bosanskialim.com (accessed January 30, 2009). 
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civilians.33  It is understandable that some feel sorry for Palestinian victims and want to 
help them, as they themselves were helped during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  
Bosniaks typically express their sympathies for Palestinians with peaceful demonstrations 
and events organized in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  Recently, a Bosnia and Herzegovina 
humanitarian organization called Merhamet collected money to help the Palestinian 
people facing a humanitarian catastrophe after Israeli attacks in the Gaza Strip.  Professor 
Fahrudin Rizvanbegovic, a member of Merhamet, appealed to Bosnia and Herzegovina 
citizens to do at least what Palestinians had done for Bosnia and Herzegovina during the 
1992-1995 war.  “‘We can do more.  Our situation is now better than theirs when they 
were helping us,’ said Professor Rizvanbegovic.”34 
Some Bosnia and Herzegovina Bosniaks are dissatisfied with the constant 
conflict, Israeli operations, and the common belief that the international community is 
unwilling to act seriously to resolve the issue.  These grievances are caused not only by 
the indifference of the international community, but also by the indifference of the Bosnia 
and Herzegovina government and its weak attempt to send a message to the international 
community in support of the Palestinians. 
The Palestinian issue is just one example among the many worldwide cases that 
can shape public opinion and help alienate people from the status quo.  The U.S. 
intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan and the Bosnia and Herzegovina government’s 
hesitation to recognize the independence of Kosovo are additional examples that may 
also be important factors.  Aleksandar Fatic expresses skepticism about the Balkan 
Muslim population’s rejection of terrorism. 
One of the reasons for relative skepticism regarding this issue is a predictable 
reaction of Muslim population to aggressive American political and military 
threats, which has taken the form of a declared “war against terrorism,” when 
it is simply a chain of international aggressions in the worst tradition of 
occupations during World War II.  The occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan 
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34 Federalna Novinska Agencija, “20.000 KM pomoci palestinskom narodu,” Fena.ba, January 1, 
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are examples of this trend, and American hawk rhetoric continues to develop 
toward Syria, Libya, and Iran.  If the American aggression continues, it will 
be only matter of time before Muslim population in the Balkans will conclude 
that worldwide terrorism is the only possible way to resist the American 
offensive against Islamic countries.35 
Considering the external factors, any violent act committed by radicalized 
members of the Bosniak community would have the purpose of sending a message that 
the neglect of Muslims’ suffering in the Middle East cannot be tolerated, and to force the 
Bosnia and Herzegovina government and the international community to take the 
situation seriously and protect Middle East Muslims. 
C. INTERNAL FACTORS 
1. Distribution of Power 
The 1991 census puts the population of Bosnia and Herzegovina at 4.3 million, of 
which 41 percent are identified as Muslim, 31.4 percent as Serb, 17.3 percent as Croat, 
and 7.6 percent as other.36  Even though the Bosniaks are a majority of the Bosnia and 
Herzegovina population, power at the state level is equally divided among the Bosniaks, 
the Croats and the Serbs.  In order to be implemented, all decisions must be accepted by 
consensus, and the Bosniaks do not have any advantage over the others.  Indeed, they are 
at a disadvantage.  The Bosnia and Herzegovina Serbs and Croats both can rely on their 
“motherlands,” Serbia and Croatia.  Almost all have dual citizenship and rights in both 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and their “motherland” countries.  On the other hand, the 
Bosniaks can rely only on Bosnia and Herzegovina as their motherland.  Therefore, any 
destabilization of Bosnia and Herzegovina would have a bigger impact on the Bosniak 
population than on the Croats and Serbs, who can easily find support in neighboring 
countries, as they did during the 1992–1995 war. 
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Generally, Bosnia and Herzegovina Serbs and Croats do not feel the same degree 
of nationalist sentiment toward Bosnia and Herzegovina as the Bosniaks.  Actually, it 
seems that most of them have accepted Bosnia and Herzegovina as an independent state 
only because they have to.  They do not cheer for Bosnia and Herzegovina national sports 
teams; indeed, they celebrate Bosnia and Herzegovina’s losses and the victories of others.  
Many of them would leave the country if they could.  The Bosniaks are frustrated by the 
behavior of Croats and Serbs who work against the country’s stability and prosperity.  
The Bosniaks can do nothing to make the situation better.  They believe that the Croats 
and Serbs should either decide to accept Bosnia and Herzegovina as their only homeland, 
with all its advantages and disadvantages, and cut their ties with neighboring countries, or 
go back to their “motherlands” and place the future of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 
Bosniak hands. 
2. Consequences of the 1992–1995 War 
The Bosnia and Herzegovina war created the greatest human suffering in Europe 
since World War II.37  During the war, about a hundred thousand people were killed, 
hundreds of thousands were affected, and half of the population was displaced.  The 
suffering of Bosnians and Herzegovinians did not stop with the end of the war.  Actually, 
there are serious concerns that the current Bosnia and Herzegovina political 
establishment is not fully committed to minimizing the negative consequences of the war.  
Nearly fifteen years after the war, the return process and the inefficiency of post conflict 
justice continue to frustrate many Bosniaks. 
a. The Return Process  
During the war, about two million people were displaced, half of the 
Bosnia and Herzegovina population.  When the war was stopped in 1995, the political 
representatives agreed that the return process would be a priority for post-conflict 
rehabilitation.  However, the process has been very slow and aggravated by many factors.  
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Much of the refugees’ property was destroyed during the war as collateral damage or 
systematically, after the war, to prevent the return of non-Serbs to their homes.  The 
destruction of property and homes is not confined to the Serbs; it was done by Bosniaks 
and Croats as well.  However, most refugees were expelled from the Republic of Srpska 
and most were Bosniaks.  Neither the state nor the entities have exerted maximum effort 
to help people to return to their homes and end their refugee status.  Those who receive 
help and return home face problems getting jobs or socializing with locals simply 
because of their ethnic backgrounds.  Families with children face additional problems 
because there is no single educational system in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but rather 
three, based on the ethnic majority in each locality.  For example, Muslim children in the 
Republic of Srpska must attend classes structured according to the Serb program, learn 
Serb history, celebrate Serb holidays and learn the Serbian language.  Often, these 
children are subject to harassment by their non-Muslim colleagues.  This behavior is not 
present only among the Serb population. 
In the central and southeastern parts of the country [in 2006], Muslim 
schoolchildren are segregated from Catholic kids in 52 schools.  When 
administrators in one such district tried to integrate a school playground, 
they received so many threatening phone calls that they scrapped the 
plan.”38 
Tens of thousands of Bosniaks have been living in exile for almost 15 
years, and many believe that their political representatives are unable or unwilling to help 
them.  In addition, there is strong resentment among Bosniaks toward the general policies 
of the Republic of Srpska, which does not seem to support the return process. 
b. Post-Conflict Justice  
Another issue that can be considered a source of grievance among the 
Bosniak population is their suffering during the war and the slow process of bringing 
alleged war criminals to justice.  The total number of war victims is estimated at around 
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100,000.39  Among these, about 65,000 were Bosniaks and 40 percent of the victims were 
civilians.  In Srebrenica, a small town within the UN protected zone, Serb forces 
executed between 7,000 and 8,000 men and boys in July 1995 as a part of the genocide 
against the Bosniaks.40  In Bosnia and Herzegovina during the war, thousands of women 
were raped, and thousands of Bosniaks were tortured in detainee camps, mostly located 
in the Republic of Srpska.  Many surviving victims know who was responsible for these 
crimes, and they are waiting for the day when their perpetrators will be brought to the 
justice.  However, justice is sometimes very slow.  The International Criminal Tribunal 
for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the local courts have limited capabilities, which 
causes some trials to last for years.  For instance, the ICTY brought the indictment 
against Serbian radical leader Vojislav Seselj in 2003 for murdering, torturing, and 
deporting non-Serbs from Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina during the war.  Seselj 
showed up at The Hague in 2006.  In 2009, more than 14 years after the crimes were 
committed, the trial is still ongoing.  A second case, even more important to Bosniaks, 
involves General Ratko Mladic.  Mladic was the Chief of Staff of the Bosnia and 
Herzegovina Serb Army during the war, and one of the persons most responsible for the 
Srebrenica massacre and siege of Sarajevo.  The ICTY indicted Mladic on charges of 
genocide, complicity in genocide, crimes against humanity and violations of the laws or 
customs of war.  Unfortunately, General Mladic is still at large. 
D. THE POLITICAL SYSTEM AND COUNTER-ELITE ELEMENTS 
Bosnia and Herzegovina is a democratic state that operates under the rule of law 
with free and democratic elections and a political system that promotes human rights and 
fundamental freedoms.  According to Mohammed Hafez, a political system is “the set of 
formal institution of the state—parliaments, government ministries, policy-implementing 
agencies—and informal channels, procedures, and ‘policy styles’ by which the state elite 
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governs.”41  The political system in Bosnia and Herzegovina is open and provides 
opportunities for political participation to everyone who follows democratic values. 
However, counter–elite elements exist in every society, including Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.  They try to exploit grievances and radicalize the masses in order to achieve 
their goals.  Although a few political parties are multinational and have a social agenda, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina political parties are mostly based on ethnic background.  These 
national parties have won almost every election since the collapse of the socialist regime 
and the one-party system.  Some use popular grievances to manipulate the masses in 
order to gain support in confrontations with their opponents.  Usually, political parties 
point to social problems to gain support for change and improvement.  In Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, however, pointing out problems means reminding the population of their 
wartime suffering and ethnic differences.  The Bosnia and Herzegovina population, and 
especially the Bosniaks, is constantly reminded of the war, which seriously undermines 
their ability to build trust and confidence toward the other ethnic groups.  Nonetheless, all 
these political parties seem to support democratic processes.  Their programs are based 
on democratic values of freedom, equal rights and opportunities for all citizens. 
1. The Patriotic League 
At the start of the war, the Party of Democratic Actions (SDA), the Bosniak 
national political party founded in 1990, had a military branch, the Patriotic League.  
John R. Shindler argues that, 
the Patriotic League was created as the SDA’s private militia, not as a 
Bosnian force; its officers were selected by the party, and it was 
established to serve Izetbegovic and his cause.42 
Even though the group declared its objective as the protection of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina sovereignty, its members usually expressed their patriotism by attacking the 
non-Muslim population.  Because many criminal elements joined the Patriotic League, 
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the group seeded fear among the citizens of Sarajevo, where the Patriotic League was the 
strongest.  The group was formed with support from Islamic countries, but its agenda, 
with a strong Bosniak nationalist sentiment, never took on a religious character.  The 
Patriotic League existed until 1992, when the Bosnia and Herzegovina Bosniak 
government created the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the group was merged into 
the new military organization. 
Some elements of the Patriotic League still exist.  The organization has a Web 
site, www.plbih.org, which serves as a virtual platform for assembling Bosnia and 
Herzegovina patriots in the country and abroad.  The organization declares itself a 
nonprofit, nonparty organization whose goals are supporting Bosnia and Herzegovina as 
a sovereign country, but there are indications of a hidden agenda of Bosniak nationalism. 
[Indeed], in its efforts to engage and actively participate in preserving the 
integrity and sovereignty of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the 
Patriotic League is committed to [among other goals] a better future for 
Bosnia and Bosniaks, [not mentioning future of other ethnic groups 
existing in the country].43 
E. CONCLUSION 
Obviously, some Bosniaks see themselves as a part of the worldwide Muslim 
community and have developed an interest in happenings in Muslim world.  This sense of 
belonging increased during the war, when Bosniaks, abandoned by Western countries and 
living under an UN–imposed arms embargo, turned to Islamic countries for help.  The 
response was prompt.  Some Middle Eastern states and organizations responded eagerly 
with all kinds of support necessary for the Bosniaks’ survival.  The relationship between 
the Bosniaks and the Islamic states established almost two decades ago still influences 
the sensibility of Bosniaks toward events in those countries.  Accordingly, the Israeli–
Palestinian conflict, the U.S. intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan, and other situations 
are seen not simply as issues involving Palestinians, Iraqis and Afghanis, but as issues for 
the worldwide Muslim community, of which Bosniaks are a part. 
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Further, the consequences of the war still shape the behavior of some Bosniaks.  
The Dayton peace agreement created a state where the majority of Bosniaks do not have 
an exclusive right to rule.  While all other states from the former Yugoslav republics are 
nation–states, Bosnia and Herzegovina remains a multinational state.  Bosniaks are the 
only ethnic group without their own state.  The distribution of power, the slow and 
cumbersome return process and slow justice for those who committed war crimes are 
disappointing to Bosnia and Herzegovina Muslims. 
Although some political parties have continuously manipulated the Bosniak 
population, arousing their nationalist sentiments to gain public support, there is no 
evidence that any political party would try to establish an armed branch with the alienated 
population, nor is there evidence that alienated masses would be attracted by extremist 
vanguards operating on the margins of the society or would adopt violence as a means of 
communication. 
Based on democratic principles, the Bosnia and Herzegovina political system 
allows everyone to participate politically and resolve their issues through the system.  
Given this opportunity, rather than turn to violence, the masses opt to support their 
favorite political parties, to organize themselves within political parties, and to resolve 
their grievances through dialog.  Political openness minimizes the chances that the 
dissatisfied masses will become violent.  Therefore, the theory of socio-political 
grievances seems inadequate to explain the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
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III. TERRORISM MOTIVATED BY RELIGION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The theory advocating religion as a root of extremist violence states that extremist 
violence motivated by religion is based on extreme interpretations of religious tradition, 
doctrine and sacred text, where violence toward real or perceived enemies is justified as a 
holy duty.44  Such groups are often intolerant toward other religious groups and see their 
perception of the world as the only correct one.  Religious extremists are not particularly 
confined to any religion.  Indeed, throughout history extremist groups have appeared in a 
variety of religions, persisted for some time, and then either rejected violence as a mean 
of communication or disappeared. 
The most recent extremist religious movement is Islamism.  Islamism rejects 
secular democratic values, resists “infidel” social, political, economic or cultural 
influences over the Muslim world, shows extreme hostility toward less committed and 
non-militant Muslims, and demands the creation of an Islamic state or order governed by 
a strict, puritanical interpretation of Islam.45  Islamism has two subgroups, gradualist and 
jihadist.  Gradualists’ approach is based on educating Muslims about Islam, influencing 
their consciousness, and infiltrating and Islamizing state institutions.  Jihadists take a 
violent approach, fighting a war against unbelievers.46  Islamists see jihad as an 
obligation of every Muslim.  They believe that this war, started in the time of 
Muhammad, will end when all those who reject Islam are converted or killed.  The long-
term conflict between Islamist jihadists and infidels has waxed and waned.  Therefore, 
religiously motivated extremist violence should be assessed in terms of the elements that 
influence the intensity of the conflict.  Susanna Pearce writes that religious doctrine,  
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religious organization and religious diasporas are in direct correlation with the intensity 
of religious conflict.47  There is no question does the conflict exist; the question is the 
strength of the extremist elements. 
In Bosnia and Herzegovina, this theory implies that Islamic radicals, supported by 
either internal or external players, would influence the Bosnia and Herzegovina Muslim 
population in an attempt to alienate them from the status quo and mobilize them as new 
members or supporters.  Strengthening the Islamist movement in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
would create a safe haven for Islamic terrorists from which they could operate deeper 
inside of Europe.  This chapter investigates the Islamists in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the 
internal and external players who support radical ideologies, and how these elements 
influence Muslim society. 
B. COUNTER-ELITE ELEMENTS 
Bosnia and Herzegovina society is a mix of Muslims and Christians.  The political 
representatives share power, promoting secular state and democratic values.  Although 
this state organization is accepted and supported by most of the population, some 
elements oppose democratization and secularization.  These elements have been trying to 
alienate moderate Muslims by persuading them to abandon their traditional Islam, which 
is characterized as corrupt and distorted, and return to strict and puritanical Islam. 
The activities of Islamic radical and Islamists are visible in the promotion of pan-
Islamic society, jihad, and different forms of radical Islam.  Because of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina’s multi-ethnicity and the dominance of moderates within the Muslim 
community, the radicals promote their goals in a less aggressive way and not too openly 
to avoid reprisals from the secular regime, non–Muslims and moderate Bosnia and 
Herzegovina Muslims.  It appears that Islamist are eager to submit to the law of the 
country as long as they are weak, but they constantly attempt to increase their numbers 
until they reach the necessary strength to wage jihad openly against infidels. 
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1. Religious Currents Promoting Islamism  
Wahhabism is an Islamic radical movement established by Muhammad ibn ‘Abd 
al Wahhab in Saudi Arabia during the eighteenth century.  Its followers preach a strict 
and puritanical interpretation of Islam.  Wahhabism is among the most radical currents 
within the Muslim world.  They are distinguished by their practice of declaring as infidels 
those Muslims who do not share their beliefs.48  The attempt of al-Wahhab was “not 
simply to purify Sunni Islam but to wage jihad against all other forms of the religion.”49  
Members of the movement have never called themselves Wahhabis or followers of any 
other form of Islam by name.  They simply call themselves Muslims preaching the real 
Islam, the Islam demanded by the Prophet Muhammad. 
It is easy to label someone, invite a new term such as Wahhabist, 
fundamentalist, terrorist, extremist…Wahhabis do not exist at our place, 
and we consider ourselves those who follow original Islam.  “I would 
never say for myself ‘I am a Wahhabi.’  For me it means nothing,” said 
Adnan Pezo, the former leader of the Active Islamic Youth.50 
Wahhabism arrived in Bosnia and Herzegovina in several ways.  First is with 
foreign Islamic fighters who came to Bosnia and Herzegovina to support local Muslims 
during the war, and who beside waging jihad had the missionary purpose of spreading a 
more radical interpretation of Islam than that practiced by moderate Bosnia and 
Herzegovina Muslims.  Second, since the collapse of the communist regime in 
Yugoslavia, the Muslim political establishment increased relations with Islamic countries 
from Middle Asia.  This allowed Islamic states to spread their influence to Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.  The Islamic countries typically offer scholarships for young Bosniaks to 
attend religious schools in the Middle East.  In addition, donors from Middle Eastern 
Islamic countries have built many mosques, religious schools and centers in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina that promote fundamentalist Islam. 
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a. Islamic Foreign Fighters 
Islamic foreign fighters who came to fight on the side of Bosniaks became 
religious indoctrinators of secular Muslims from the very first days of their presence in 
the country.  They formed a military unit called el-Mujahid, and the unit enjoyed a 
special status within the Bosniak defense forces and Bosniak community.  The members 
of the unit lived according to strict Shari’a, and their fighting was driven by jihadist 
ideology.  Everybody who wanted to join the unit had to pass several weeks of religious 
indoctrination, learning how to practice true Islam and to live according to Islamic 
religious norms.  After the war, many Mujahideen left the country and went to other 
places where they could continue the jihad, but not all of them.  Some stay in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina to continue their missionary activities, and some remain because they have 
nowhere else to go or have married Bosniak women and established families. 
The Citizenship Review Commission (CRC), formed to review the status 
of foreign mujahedin fighters and others who obtained Bosnian citizenship 
during and after the 1992–95 war, completed its review of approximately 
1200 cases.  The CRC withdrew citizenship from 612 individuals it 
deemed to have obtained Bosnian citizenship unlawfully.51 
Foreigners who remained after the war have merged with radicalized 
Bosniaks in several locations.  The biggest location is in Maoca Gornja, a village about 
20 kilometers south of Brcko town, where they have established an Islamic community 
and live according to Islamic religious rules.  Children attend religious school with a 
curriculum based on the Jordanian educational system controlled by Nusret Imamovic, a 
self-proclaimed teacher and director of the school.  Imamovic is a Bosniak convert and an 
important figure in radical circles of Bosnia and Herzegovina Muslims.  Imamovic 
publicly refuses any kind of collaboration with the Bosnia and Herzegovina Islamic 
community, and rejects legally elected Bosnia and Herzegovina authorities.  Responding 
to a question about Muslims and democratic elections, he says, 
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We [Muslims] do not need to answer in the elections, as it is the kind of 
support to taghuts [scholars in the service of tyrants], and we are 
responsible to give up from them with not believing in them.  It means that 
we must oppose them instead support them.52 
Imamovic also comments on suicide bombing, saying, “This fighting we 
do not consider as prohibited; however, at the same time we do not think that it should be 
used like the classical weapons, but only in special occasions and situations.”53 
In 2005, in an interview with a journalist from Vecernji list, a newspaper 
from Croatia, Enes Mujkanovic, another convert and the leader of the Wahhabi group in 
Gornja Maoca, spoke openly about their intolerance of anyone who does not share their 
beliefs.  He says that he prays to Allah for all Muslims in the world to turn to Allah and 
follow His way.  When the journalist asked him why they live isolated from the rest of 
the Bosnia and Herzegovina population, he said that they lived in accordance with 
Mohammed’s laws, and when trouble occurs, one must retreat into isolation and wait for 
the right moment to take revenge against the enemy.  He says that he believes that when 
Allah’s army enters Rome and decimates the crusaders, they would be at its head.54 
b. Foreign Sponsorship 
Wahhabism originates in Saudi Arabia, and with their strong financial 
support has been spreading to other countries with Muslim populations.  Typically, Saudi 
donors promote Wahhabism with scholarships to attend institutions of higher education 
in some Middle Eastern Islamic countries and by providing in–country capabilities for 
preaching, religious schools and recreational centers. 
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The offer of scholarships to Bosnia and Herzegovina youth to attend 
universities, mostly in Mecca, started during the war.  Since then, several generations of 
students have graduated and returned to the country.  One of these students was Jusuf 
Barcic.  When he came back, he started promoting a form of Islam different from the one 
commonly practiced by Bosnia and Herzegovina Muslims.  His followers increased 
slowly and steadily.  Barcic was in constant conflict with the Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Islamic community.  He and his followers denied any positive law, claiming there is a no 
law besides Allah’s law.  Barcic was killed in a car accident, but his movement did not 
die with him.  Over 3,000 mourners, from Bosnia and Herzegovina and elsewhere in 
Europe, attended his funeral, an indicator of the expansion of radical Wahhabi ideology. 
Another way of spreading fundamentalist Islam is by building mosques, 
religious schools and centers in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  According to some analyses, 
more than $700 million has been invested in Bosnia and Herzegovina by Saudi–financed 
organizations.  Reportedly, the bulk of investments has gone to build new mosques, 
renovate old ones, and establish Islamic educational institutions.  For instance, Sarajevo’s 
King Fahd bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud Mosque and Cultural Center was built in 2000 with 
Saudi funds and operates with Saudi financing.  The estimated cost of the mosque and its 
sports and cultural center is more than $28 million.55  Saudi funded Islamic Pedagogical 
Academies teaching a much more conservative form of Islam to their Bosniak students 
have also been established in Bihac and Zenica. 
The King Fahd mosque in Sarajevo and many other mosques built or 
rebuilt with assistance from foreign donors have been given a different appearance more 
characteristic of Middle East architecture than the Ottoman building style used by Bosnia 
and Herzegovina Muslims.  “Indeed the entire Bosnia and Herzegovina landscape is 
being remade with the construction of numerous ‘petro-dollar’ ultra-modern Middle 
Eastern style mosques.”56  The preaching in these mosques, like their architecture, differs 
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from that accepted and practiced by the Bosniaks since Ottoman rule.  The mosque, its 
medresa, administrative offices and cultural center are controlled by the Saudis, not the 
Bosnia and Herzegovina Islamic community.  With its extra-territorial status, the mosque 
has become a major center of Wahhabism in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
Finally, many religious schools provide free education for Bosniak youth, 
with lectures in the Arabic language.  Living according strict religious rules is one of the 
conditions of attending these schools.  In post conflict countries with poor economic and 
social conditions like Bosnia and Herzegovina, free education is an attractive choice for 
less wealthy people as a way of providing some kind of education, even if it is religious, 
for their children. 
My husband was killed in Srebrenica in 1995 and I was left with four 
children, no income, no skills.  The aid I receive means we can live 
decently, but I have to respect the religious laws.  My daughters are 
attending a religious school for free, and my sons will study for free either 
in Sarajevo or in any big Muslim country.57 
This is a typical story how Muslim youth from Bosnia and Herzegovina 
are recruited to spread fundamentalist Islam from middle Asia.  
2. Web Sites and Organizations Promoting Islamism and Jihad 
Nowadays, the most common and the efficient way of spreading information is 
through Web sites, chat rooms and on-line forums.  Islamists use those opportunities very 
successfully, and Bosnia and Herzegovina is not spared their influence.  There are several 
Web sites in the Bosnian language from organizations promoting jihad and radical 
Islamic ideology. 
a. Pilgrims’ Journe—Put vjernika  
One of the Web sites that regularly expresses a negative attitude toward 
both the democratization of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Westerners, mostly Americans, 
is Put vjernika.  In February 2009, the site published a movie, Juba, the Baghdad Sniper, 
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showing the execution of American soldiers patrolling or manning checkpoints in Iraq.  
According to the Federal Police (FUP), the movie was initially distributed among radical 
Bosniaks of the Wahhabi movement who had expressed willingness to go to Afghanistan 
or Iraq.58  In a questionnaire posted on the Web site, visitors expressed their perceptions 
of the American operation in middle Asia, with more than 90 percent believing that the 
American war on Islamist terrorism is nothing other than a war against Islam and 
Muslims. 
On the same site, Dr. Ebu Hazim el-Dzibali published an article, “What 
fooled them?” criticizing behavior of Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  He says that 
the Bosniaks have diverged from Allah’s path for the creation of an Islamic society and 
that the democracy accepted by Bosniaks is the final evil opposing creation of a society 
in accordance with Allah’s will.59 
It is not clear who has been financing and moderating the site.  The 
president of the Committee for Defense and Security in the Parliament of the Republic of 
Srpska, Petar Djokic, says that “it [was] believed that [Enes Mujkanovic] the leader of 
Islamists from Gornja Maoca also runs an extremist Bosnian Muslim Web site, 
www.putvjernika.com.”60  Even if the owner is unknown, the purpose of the site is 
perfectly clear.  The site is designated to promote jihad and anti-Western and anti-
democratic ideology, targeting the Bosnia and Herzegovina Bosniak population as a 
source of new members and sympathizers. 
b. Ensarije Serijata 
Ensarije Serijata is a clandestine organization promoting jihad and anti-
Western, anti-democratic ideology.  As stated on the Web site’s page “O nama” (“About 
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Us”), the organization was founded in 1994 by Muslims who wanted to deliver an 
Islamic message blocked by non-Muslims and some Muslims who support a form of 
Islam closer to the principles and laws of Islam’s enemies.  The organization owns a 
Bosnian language Web site where the members of the organization openly promote their 
extremist ideology.  The origin of the site is not known, nor is it known who finances and 
maintains it.61  The site has many translations of papers by Abu Hamza al–Masri, a 
former imam of North London Central Mosque and supporter of al-Qaeda.  Without a 
doubt, both the site and the organization are parts of the global jihad network. 
We are here to defend Allah’s Law.  Some of us have already been killed, 
and some are in prison.  We have correspondents in countries where jihad 
is waged and we support all the Islamic Jihad groups that are stale in the 
defense of Islamic law.62 
The members of the organization worked to help the Mujahideen and 
refugees in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Kashmir and elsewhere.  This assistance consists of a 
presence on the battlefields, various religious projects, and opposition to anti-Islamic 
propaganda.  They also provide military counseling to Muslims so they can help 
oppressed Muslims and not be misguided and deceived by western European society.63   
Because of its clandestine nature, the activities of the organization cannot 
be identified and separated from other activities seen in Bosnia and Herzegovina that are 
a part of the Islamization of Bosnia and Herzegovina Muslims; therefore, the 
organization’s physical presence in the country is open to question. 
c. Active Islamic Youth 
The Active Islamic Youth was an organization established during the war 
by a group of Bosniaks attempting to promote the fundamentalist Islamic teachings that 
they learned from foreign Islamic fighters while serving in the same unit, El-Mujahid.  
The mission of the organization is to awake the religious sentiment of the Bosnia and 
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Herzegovina Muslim population, which has been deprived of “traditional” Islam by the 
Communist regime of the former Yugoslavia and by Muslims who practice moderate 
Islam, and return the society to the strict, puritanical interpretation of the sacred text.  The 
members of the organization are young Bosniaks who find their life philosophy in 
religion.  Adnan Pezo, the former leader of the organization, says that only Bosniaks 
were in the organization.  “We cannot allow ourselves to have some Arabs here because 
it would, perhaps, produce aversion in some people,” he told the magazine Dani.64  The 
embassy of the United States in Bosnia and Herzegovina describes the organization and 
its activities as extremist and bursting with anti-American rhetoric spread through its 
weekly print and online publication, SAFF Magazine.65 
In order to attract more members and spread their ideology, the 
organization established two main sectors, a sector for Da’va and a sector for sport and 
culture.  The purpose of the Da’va sector is to organize courses on Islamic teachings and 
the English and Arabic languages within the entire Federation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.  The sport and culture sector has organized the Tae Kwon Do Academy, 
which operates in Zenica, Bugojno, and Travnik. 
The organization was very active before September 11, 2001.  One of its 
many activities was organizing a demonstration against the war in Chechnya.  The 
demonstration took place on March 17, 2000, when a couple of hundred people gathered 
in front of the Begova mosque in Sarajevo and walked through Ferhadija Street.  Even 
though this was supposed to be an ordinary gathering to raise a voice against violence, 
and without any political or other hidden agenda, the event escalated into something else.  
The participants carried green and black flags with Arabic inscriptions, and the whole 
street shouted “Allahu akber,” (Allah is great).  The leader of the Active Islamic Youth, 
Adnan Pezo, gave a speech calling on people to help their “brothers” in Chechnya, and 
most of his speech was in the Arabic language.  Instead of showing solidarity with the 
victims of Putin’s terror, some participants, dressed in typical Arabic clothes, the men 
with long beards, started to blame United States politics, some Bosnia and Herzegovina 
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opposition politicians, and Magazin dani, calling for jihad against Madeleine Albright, 
Zlatko Lagumdzija, Senad Pecanin and the magazine.66 
After September 11, the organization was under investigation and it was 
discovered that the organization was financed by Saudi humanitarian organizations, 
including Al Haramain.  In autumn 2002, the United States declared Al Haramain as an 
organization sponsoring terrorist networks and froze its funds.  Many Saudi donors 
stopped sending money to the Active Islamic Youth because of its bad reputation due to 
its radical nature and collaboration with organizations sponsoring terrorism.  With 
problems in its functioning, and especially its financing, in 2008 the organization 
“experienced fractures among its leaders and is no longer an officially registered 
organization in Bosnia.”67  However, the members of the organization are still active as 
evidenced by the normal maintenance of its Web site and publication of the SAFF 
Magazine, the official voice of Active Islamic Youth. 
3. Manipulating the Masses Through Religion and Culture 
Bosnia and Herzegovina’s society, as a part of the former Yugoslavia, had equal 
rights for women and men.  Women could get the same jobs as men and they could 
participate in politics and serve as teachers.  They were not just mothers and 
homemakers; indeed, women were present in every sphere of society.  Bosnia and 
Herzegovina’s women were well educated and emancipated.  The literacy rate for 
females in Bosnia and Herzegovina is around 97 percent and still growing.  To cut ties 
with old Muslim habits, where women were treated according to Islamic traditions and 
beliefs, the Yugoslavian government prohibited the wearing of veils. 
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It was 1950, toward the end of September, when hundreds of Muslim 
women filled the streets of the Bosnian capital, Sarajevo, and ceremonially 
took off their veils.  The symbolic act was intended to mark the end of an 
era when they left their homes “covered.68 
Forty years later, in the same Bosnia and Herzegovina, fully covered women and 
men with long beards became common.69 
‘Hijab [a veil] is a matter of choice,’ Fahira Fejzic Chengic from the Faculty of 
Political Science in Sarajevo recently wrote in a local magazine.  “I decided to 
wear it, fully aware of all positive and negative consequences.”… She took to 
traditional Islamic clothes and the veil during the 1992-95 war when former 
Yugoslavia fell apart.70 
Wearing a veil is really the choice of each individual, but in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, it became a tool for distinguishing between Muslims and non–Muslims.  
Alienated Muslims become more vulnerable to manipulation. 
Fahira Fejzic Chengic is a wife of Hasan Chengic, a Muslim cleric, who was 
convicted in the 1980s together with Alija Izetbegovic by the regime of Yugoslavia for 
promoting radical Islamic ideology.  After prison, he became an important figure in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina political life.  During the war, Chengic had been involved in 
Iranian arms shipments to Bosnia and Herzegovina.  In addition, Chengic was involved in 
activities of the Third World Relief Agency (TWRA), a false humanitarian organization 
connected to Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda terrorist network.  As an active member 
of SDA, Mrs. Cengic has been responsible for providing journalist support to the 
activities of her husband.71  Therefore, it was not clear did Mrs. Chengic decide to wear a 
veil due to her religious beliefs or to give her contribution in manipulating with the 
Bosniaks women.  Further, it has not been a matter of choice for all women.  For some it 
was requirement in order to get aid.  “Aid organizations from Islamic countries looked  
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after widows, and demanded strict respect of Islamic laws in return.”72  In addition, in 
some places in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Islamic humanitarian organizations provide 
money to women who wear hijab. 
Another unclear situation is related to the character of the Bosnia and 
Herzegovina war as seen from the Bosniak perspective on the one hand, and the dual 
status of the Bosniaks who lost their lives during the war on the other.  While some 
Western scholars claim that some Muslims units waged jihad in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Bosniak politicians have been quiet and not forthcoming regarding this question.  The 
topic of jihad in Bosnia and Herzegovina is avoided; at least it is not publicly discussed.  
Jihad is described in the Qur’an as “holy war against any who interfere with the practice 
of Islam.  In practice, jihad was often carried out as aggressive war well beyond the 
borders of Islam.”73  Declaring existence of the jihad in Bosnia and Herzegovina would 
undermine publicly declared policies by the Bosniak politicians, who state that the Army 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina74 fought not only for the Bosniak ethnic group, but also for 
the freedom of all people in the country.  Many Bosniaks do not believe that jihad was 
waged during the war.  However, the Bosniaks who were killed are categorized into two 
groups with two different names.  While some have been named dead soldiers and 
fighters, others have been named shahids, a term that generally refers to a person killed 
on Allah’s path, or in other words, Mujahid killed in the jihad.  Even knowing all these 
facts, some Bosniak politicians still deny the existence of a religious war, stating how 
they have been “fighting” for an independent Bosnia and Herzegovina with equal rights 
for everybody, while Serbs and Croats have been more or less seeking secession from the 
country. 
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C. EVIDENCE OF TERRORIST PRESENCE 
While the country has been tied to terrorism mostly because of imported foreign 
fighters and their relation to terrorist groups, there have been several incidents committed 
by radicalized Bosniaks.  These incidents do not necessary have the elements necessary 
to be labeled as terrorist acts, but can be considered serious threats to security due to their 
intolerant and destabilizing nature. 
On December 24, 2002, Muamer Topalovic, a young Muslim extremist, killed 
three members of a Croatian family from Konjic, a town about 80 kilometers south of 
Sarajevo.  When arrested, Topalovic said that he wanted to act against Croats, explaining 
his motives as religious-ideological fanaticism.  Topalovic admitted that he was a 
member of the Active Islamic Youth and the Islamic humanitarian organization Jam’iyat 
al-Furkan.  The organization provided religious education for Bosniak children and sold 
religious literature.  However, later investigation showed that Topalovic was never an 
active member of the Active Islamic Youth. 
In October 2005, Mirsad Bektasevic, Abdulkadir Cesur, Bajro Ikanovic, and 
Senad Hasanovic were arrested in Sarajevo and charged with possession of explosives 
and planning a terrorist attack against an unnamed target.  The leader of the group, 
Bektasevic, was born in Bosnia and Herzegovina and migrated during the war to Sweden 
where he got citizenship.  The investigation found that the group was linked to terrorist 
networks elsewhere in Europe.75 
In October 2008, a group of men, members of the Wahhabi movement, physically 
attacked participants at gay festival held in Sarajevo while exclaiming “Allahu akber!” 
and “Kill the gays!”  The representatives of the Bosnia and Herzegovina Islamic 
community defended the attackers, saying that holding such a festival during the month 
of Ramadan was a provocation; although the organizer said that the purpose of the 
festival was to promote minorities’ rights, not to provoke anybody.76 
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In February 2009, Glas Srpske, an internet Web portal, posted an article saying 
that arming of members of Wahhabi movement and Bosniaks in the territory of the 
Republic of Srpska, as well as collecting money for their activities, have been evident 
over the last three years.  The author of the article pointed to Muhamed Porca, the imam 
of the Al–Tawhid Mosque in Vienna and an informal leader of Wahhabi movement in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, as responsible for the illegal activities.77 
In February 2009, German journalists from Der Spiegel reported that the imam of 
the King Fahd mosque, Nezim Halilovic, often preached about destroying Israel and 
Jews, calling them Zionist terrorists and saying that their end already came.78 
D. CONCLUSION 
Islamic foreign fighters brought a new form of Islam unknown to the traditional 
Sunni Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  They started indoctrinating Bosnia and 
Herzegovina Muslims immediately upon their arrival during early 1990s, and the 
indoctrination continues.  This form of radical Islam, advocated by foreign missionaries, 
is known to the West as the Wahhabi movement.  Wahhabism is spread not only by 
Islamic missionaries, but also through different religious programs sponsored mostly by 
Saudi Arabia.  In addition, many scholarships are provided by Islamic countries to 
Bosniak youth so they can attend religious universities in some Islamic states.  The 
Wahhabi missionaries succeeded in attracting some young Bosniaks, who abandoned 
their traditional Islam and adopted a radical Islamic ideology.  In less than fifteen years, 
the Wahhabi movement grew to more than 6,000 Bosniaks.  Young Bosniaks abandoned 
traditional and moderate Islam and indoctrinated by missionaries from the Middle East 
accepted a form of Islam that is unfriendly and intolerant of non-Muslims and less 
committed Muslims. 
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The radicalized Bosniaks say that they promote the new ideologies peacefully and 
in a spirit of developing a shared life among the different religions in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.  According to them, the ideologies they advocate are not violent and do not 
have any ties to the global Islamic terrorist network.  They do not see jihad as a fight on 
Allah’s path against infidels, but as a daily struggle inside of each believer with all kinds 
of issues and problems.  They attempt to spread their beliefs through da’wa, fighting for 
their goals by spreading the words of Allah as practicing true Islam.  
However, reality proves differently.  Although they believe that their activism is 
peaceful, several incidents committed by Wahhabis provide another view.  In addition, 
many Web sites and even some organizations in Bosnia and Herzegovina promote 
violence, calling for jihad against the United States and its allies.  Therefore, if not now, 
perhaps in the near future, more radicalized Bosniaks may come under the influence of 
the jihadist vanguards and adopt violence to forcefully spread their beliefs or as part of a 
holy war against unbelievers. 
So far, there had been only a few terrorist acts involving radicalized Bosniaks, 
and only one resulted in casualties, the brutal killing of a Croat family from Konjic 
committed by Muamer Topalovic.  This can be considered a terrorist act motivated by 
religion, and also, a continuation of the type of ethnic violence common during the war 
period.  The local newspapers and some officials eagerly declared this incident to be an 
Islamist terrorist act, even though the purpose of the killings and Topalovic’s intent are 
not so clear.  Therefore, one can conclude that participation of the Bosniaks in global 
Islamic terrorist network activities is minimal or unimportant for the functioning of the 
terrorist network. 
Western scholars do not usually see a strong causal relation between terrorism and 
Islam.  In order to understand this relationship, we should look not to Western 
perceptions, but to how Islamic radicals see terrorism.  According to Islamic radicals, 
there are three elements of terrorism: natural terrorism, Islamist terrorism and non–
Islamist terrorism.  Islamic or prescribed terrorism is the first level of duty for every 
Muslim believer.  It involves amplifying the Islamic state and the authority of Islam and 
removes depravity, injustice and the miseries of the poor and needy.  It is said that this 
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method was used by the Prophet and his Ashabs (followers of Muhammad who had 
personal contact with him) and now it is used by the Mujahideen following Sunna of the 
Prophet.79 
Jasmin Merdan, a Wahhabi dissident and co-author of a book on Wahhabi 
ideology and history, said the issue was not that they prayed or dressed 
differently, but that they were intolerant and aggressive toward other 
Muslims.  “These are mostly young, uneducated people,” he said.  
Merdan, who converted in the late 1990s but later left the sect 
disillusioned, said many Muslim militants who carry out attacks against 
Western targets were “a product of Wahhabi indoctrination.” 80 
In conclusion, Bosnia and Herzegovina faces the presence and growth of Islamist 
movements spreading radical Islamic ideologies.  The Islamist vanguards, sponsored by 
foreign donors, are active within Bosnia and Herzegovina Muslim society, radicalizing 
the masses and increasing the number of new followers. In addition to the presence of 
Islamist gradualists, Bosnia and Herzegovina faces Islamist extremists that oppose 
secular and democratic values through various means, glorifying martyrs and calling for 
jihad against infidels.  Even lacking a declared terrorist group in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, the country has radicalized masses among which the terrorist vanguard can 
recruit new members and find necessary support for operating within the country and 
abroad. 
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IV. THE DEVELOPMENT OF TERRORIST NETWORKS IN 
PERMISSIVE ENVIRONMENTS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The Bosnia and Herzegovina civil war ended on December 14, 1995, when 
domestic political leaders mediated by the international community signed the General 
Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP).  The international community and the Bosnia 
and Herzegovina politicians accepted the responsibility to stop hostilities, build trust 
between belligerent parties, and provide a safe, stable, law-enforced environment for all 
persons in the country.  The international military forces deployed to Bosnia and 
Herzegovina in December 1995 did a noteworthy job of implementing the military aspect 
of the GFAP.81  With the High Representative82 (HR) for Bosnia and Herzegovina as the 
supreme authority, the international community has controlled every aspect of the 
implementation of the GFAP. 
The international community succeeded in stopping hostilities, but it seems that 
they failed to make a self-sustainable and stable country.  Years after the war’s end, and 
despite the aid of several international bodies focused on security issues, corruption, 
organized crime and the black market remain unresolved security threats.  The U.S. 
embassy reported in 2007 to the American State Department that “Bosnia remained a 
weak, decentralized state and ethnically-based political confrontations continued to 
undermine national government.”83 
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Research by the Fund for Peace shows that Bosnia and Herzegovina cannot be 
considered a stable state.  Indeed, the Failed State Index for Bosnia and Herzegovina 















Figure 1. Failed State Index for Bosnia and Herzegovina84 (lower is better) 
 





The Failed State Index classification varies from 1 to 120, where states classified 
between 1 and 30 are considered sustainable, and those from 91 to 120 are states under 
“alert.”  Even though Bosnia and Herzegovina has made significant progress in the last 
few years, and progressed from the worst group to the group under “warning,” the 
situation is still far from satisfactory, especially considering the 2007 and 2008 results, 
which show a reversal of the positive trend.  According to the Fund for Peace, twelve 
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content&task=view&id=99&Itemid=140 (accessed June 19, 2009). 
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indicators may be included in defining the state, which are divided into the three major 
categories of economic, social and political indicators.  These indicators are neither 
exclusive nor exhaustive for defining the state and additional indicators can be added as 
well.85  
James A. Piazza empirically demonstrates a relationship between failed and 
failing states and transnational terrorist activities, showing that weak states are more 
likely to host or have their own terrorist groups.86  Because of its weaknesses, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina is seen as a state “vulnerable to exploitation as a potential staging ground 
for terrorist operations in Europe.”87 
The theory of permissive environment fits the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina if 
it is assumed that the constant confrontations among Bosnia and Herzegovina politicians 
results in attrition of state institutions and the mechanisms responsible for providing basic 
goods to its citizens.  As a result, the state would be unable to efficiently control border 
crossings or the entire territory, the level of corruption would be very high, bureaucracy 
would be slow and ineffective, the country would be economically unstable, and the 
efficient rule of law would not be established.  In addition, with political elements 
supportive of radical ideologies, Bosnia and Herzegovina might be seen as a country 
providing space for terrorist vanguards to exist, recruiting new followers and establishing 
bases from which they might operate abroad. 
Given the country’s recent history, the characteristics of its inhabitants and its 
current situation, one might say that political instability—based on ethnic divisions—the 
political elite support of Islamic ideologies, and the geographic-demographic 
characteristics of the state can be considered direct or indirect reasons why Bosnia and 
Herzegovina seems to have a permissive environment for Islamic radicals and Islamic 
terrorists. 
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B. POLITICAL INSTABILITY OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 
While political instability, the “propensity of a government collapse,”88 is not 
considered a primary cause of the development of terrorist networks or affiliates, James 
Forest notes that politically unstable regimes are more prone to attract terrorist 
organizations than stable regimes.  Unstable regimes in particular countries create a 
permissive environment that inhibits domestic organizations and mechanisms that might 
prevent terrorist organizations from developing.89 
Since the beginning of its existence as an independent state, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina has always been considered a weak state divided by factionalism and ethnic 
politics.  The main impediment to progress is continued ethnically based confrontations 
between leading politicians representing various ethnic groups.  In a December 2008 
article, the New York Times describes the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina as tense. 
The country’s leaders are so busy fighting one another that they are 
impeding Bosnia from progressing.  Locked in an impasse of mutual 
recrimination are Haris Silajdzic, the Muslim in the country’s three-
member presidency, who has called for the Serbian Republic to be 
abolished, and the Bosnian Serb prime minister, Milorad Dodik, who is 
supported by Russia and Serbia and who has dangled the threat that his 
republic could secede.90  
Acrimony between the two politicians became so intense in 2008 that it reminded 
many of the months just after the war’s end, when former belligerents may have stopped 
shooting but were still did not speak except to hurl insults. 
Many local politicians and even some international ones see Milorad Dodik, with 
his nationalist rhetoric, as the main obstacle to progress and one of the biggest opponents 
of strengthening national institutions.  He many times has publicly stated that he is 
against any centralization at the state level.  According to Dodik, the country should be 
highly decentralized and the governance should be left to the entities.  How strongly 
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Dodik has defended his political beliefs was seen during the reform of the armed forces.  
For years, Dodik opposed creation of the common Armed Forces of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and the transfer of command responsibility from the entity level to the state 
level.  When he realized that the international community and particularly the U.S. would 
not accept two armies in one country where power would be concentrated in the hands of 
politicians at the entity levels, Dodik proposed total demilitarization of the country.  
Some researchers go even further, stating that because of his nationalist rhetoric and 
arrogant behavior toward Bosniak and Croat politicians, Dodik should be considered a 
serious threat to the stabilization process in Bosnia and Herzegovina.91 
Haris Silajdzic is another political player whose behavior and rhetoric negatively 
influence the stability of the country.  His political platform is based on abolishing the 
existence of Republic of Srpska, breaking its strong relations with Serbia, and creating a 
stronger, unitary state centered in Sarajevo.  His attitude and policies are seen as hostile 
to Serb and Croat interests in the country and an attempt to create a Bosniak-dominated 
state.  Showing low tolerance to the needs and concerns of Serbs and Croats, his 
campaign of the few last years is a major factor that deepens divisions and creates 
tensions between ethnic groups in the country. 
These two politicians are not the only ones seen as responsible for slow progress 
and an unstable environment in the country.  The fact that both of them were elected by 
the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina in democratic and free elections in 2006, and that 
both of their campaigns were based on nationalist agendas, indicates that the country is 
still deeply divided and the environment is still unsupportive of national rapprochement. 
The consequences of political instability and constant confrontation among local 
politicians from different ethnic groups can be seen in the weak coercive and 
administrative capabilities of the state. 
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1. Weak Coercive Capabilities 
The security system in Bosnia and Herzegovina has been established according to 
democratic norms and standards.  There are several organizations dealing with internal 
security issues, and most of these organizations have been equipped, trained, and coached 
by the international community.  In addition, there is significant cooperation between 
Bosnia and Herzegovina security organization and similar organizations in other 
countries.  However, the lack of political unity and political interference in law 
enforcement has influenced the efficiency of these organizations for years. 
One of the biggest obstacles for reaching the necessary level of efficiency of the 
security organizations in Bosnia and Herzegovina is the ethnic sensibility of the 
population.  The personnel structure of all state organizations is based on the principle of 
equality of all three ethnic groups according the census from 1991.  This means that 
leading positions in any organization are equally divided among Bosniaks, Serbs, and 
Croats, and other positions are allocated according the population living in the area.  This 
structure is a warrant of stability and protects the national interest of each group in the 
country.  However, this structure has been misused by many politicians, businessmen, 
and other influential people to protect their own interests, to manipulate the masses or to 
cover up illegal or criminal activities.  Whenever a security organization conducts 
investigations of these people, they must assign the case to members of the organization 
from the same ethnic group as the suspects, or the organization would be accused of 
animosity and revenges.  The Bosnia and Herzegovina population has been so heavily 
manipulated that they automatically react to such accusations by supporting the 
wrongdoers and calling for the investigation to be mitigated or halted. 
The second staffing failure common to security organizations involves political 
eligibility.  In general, to be employed by some of these organizations, the appointment 
requires a “green light” from the leading political party, and generally, each national 
party would support only candidates from their own ethnic group.  This means that the 
political parties, which are mostly national parties, have placed their own people within 
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each organization.  The mutual protection of the parties’ own interest is presented as a 
matter of national interest and for this reason is supported by the manipulated population. 
a. State Investigation and Protection Agency (SIPA) 
The State Investigation and Protection Agency was established in 2002.  
Its primary tasks were to protect important persons, government facilities and consular 
diplomatic missions.  In 2004, the parliament extended the tasks of the SIPA to include 
fighting organized crime, arresting war criminals and fighting terrorism.92  The efficiency 
of the SIPA is very questionable. 
The State Investigation and Protection Agency (SIPA) is the Bosnia 
agency with primary responsibility for counterterrorism operations.  The 
position of SIPA Director was unfilled for most of 2008 and the agency’s 
readiness and capabilities suffered as a result.  In addition, the head of the 
Ministry of Security, parent organization to SIPA, politicized the 
Ministry’s terrorism threat analysis and counterterrorism operations.  
Although Bosnian capabilities and potential for independent action were 
degraded over the year, Bosnian authorities were generally effective and 
responsive to U.S. counterterrorism cooperation requests.93 
Thus far, the agency faces difficulties in fighting organized crime and 
terrorism, which can be explained by the complicated political situation in the country.  
Whenever the agency has investigated politicians or sensitive issues, an ethnic dimension 
has been ascribed to its activities, and the agency has been accused of directing its 
activities against one ethnic group while supporting another, even though the agency’s 
work is simply directed against wrongdoers. 
For years, the Bosnia and Herzegovina political magazine 60 Minutes has 
provided evidence that Dodik is involved in organized crime and corruption, but no one 
conducted any investigations of these allegations.  Everybody, including the 
representatives of the international community, seemed afraid of Dodik’s reaction and the 
reaction of the Bosnia and Herzegovina Serbs.  Finally, in 2008, SIPA initiated an 
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investigation of his conversations about several construction projections, including the 
building for the Government of Republic Srpska, the highway between Banja Luka and 
Gradiska, and the building for the Republic of Srpska’s Radio and Television department.  
In response, in March 2009 Dodik threatened to withdraw Serbs from state institutions if 
SIPA did not stop its investigation, claiming that their investigation is politically 
motivated and orchestrated.  Dodik told reporters in Banja Luka on June 11, 2009, that he 
is not interested in SIPA, and that he would not attend a hearing if he were summoned.  
He said cynically, “Let them try to detain me.”94 
b. General Police 
The reform of police structures in Bosnia and Herzegovina has been one 
of the most complicated and tense reforms.  The police forces had been functioning 
according to pre-war communist doctrine.  In 1997, the High Representative expressed 
his intention to use his final authority to reform the police according to democratic 
principles and to create a unique police structure in Bosnia and Herzegovina that would 
coordinate its activities in fighting organized crime and other destabilizing elements.  The 
local authorities, representatives of the United Nations International Police Task Force 
(IPTF), later known as the European Union Police Forces (EUPF), the NATO-led troops, 
and the OHR spent around 11 years seeking an acceptable structure and supreme 
authority for the country’s police forces.  Dodik blocked progress toward the creation of a 
common structure for the General Police, arguing that there was no need for a centralized 
General Police because of the existence of the SIPA as state level specialized police.  
Finally, in 2008 the parties reached agreement.  However, so far nothing has happened 
beyond the signing of an agreement.95  At the beginning, the EU was very clear and 
strong in their request for a strong and efficient police force that would not recognize the 
administrative lines of the entities and would share a common command structure.  
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Ultimately, the EU, as well as local politicians, accepted a questionable solution, 
establishing only a coordinating body at the state level.  Votes in favor of the proposed 
laws numbered 22, while 19 were against, and one representative abstained.  More than a 
year later, the agreement has not been implemented. 
c. Border Police 
Bosnia and Herzegovina has about 10,000 kilometers of borders with 
Croatia, Serbia and Monte Negro.  The Bosnia and Herzegovina Border Police employs 
only 2,000 people.  Lack of money and political will makes the border very porous, and 
the Border Police cannot efficiently control it.  In an interview, the director of the Border 
Police, Vinko Dumancic says that the Border Police is a very professional organization 
but due to lack of personnel and very difficult land configuration, the police are not able 
to control every crossing.  He adds that the most critical area to control is along the 
human trafficking routes, which includes the southeast border entrance to the country and 
the northwest border with Croatia.96  Unofficially, Bosnia and Herzegovina has more than 
a hundred illegal border crossings, not counting possible crossings for walkers. 
The weak mechanism for controlling border crossings can be seen in the 
case of Anto Jelavic, a former member of Bosnia and Herzegovina presidency and 
president of Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ).  In 2005, Jelavic was convicted of 
misusing authority and public corruption and sentenced to 10 years in prison.  He escaped 
from prison and fled to Croatia two days before the verdict was read.97  He escaped the 
country through a small controlled border crossing in Herzegovina.  Although the Bosnia 
and Herzegovina Court’s Appeal Council Unit for Organized, Economic Crime and 
Corruption lifted the first verdict and ordered that the main trial be redone, Jelavic 
refused to return and remained at large in neighboring Croatia.98  On April 8, 2009, 
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Jelavic was kidnapped from Zagreb and brought to the Bosnia and Herzegovina town of 
Rama, where he was blackmailed for a million euros.  Jelavic Somehow escaped his 
kidnappers and showed up in Zagreb on April 9, 2009.  The fact that Bosnia and 
Herzegovina institutions have not be able to bring Jelavic to justice since his escape to 
Croatia in 2005, and the fact that he crossed the Bosnia and Herzegovina border twice in 
less than 24 hours shows that Bosnia and Herzegovina security organizations are very 
weak and not able to efficiently control the country’s borders and its territory.  If a public 
figure like Jelavic can leave and enter the country undetected, then anonymous members 
of worldwide terrorist networks can even more easily access the country and remain safe 
and undisturbed. 
2. Administrative Incapacity 
Administrative incapacity is a failure of the state to provide basic services for its 
citizens as modern states should.  It includes a “minimal level of personal security, 
economic stability, and functioning bureaucratic and judicial institutions.”99  In Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, administrative incapacity is manifested in the weak state decision 
making process, high levels of corruption that infiltrate almost all spheres of society, 
economic instability, and inefficient judicial institutions. 
a. Weak State Decision-Making Process 
Political animosity and intolerance result in the inability of the Bosnia and 
Herzegovina Parliament to agree on almost any decision that would improve the future of the 
country.  One of the major proposals was a reform of the Constitution to strengthen the 
central government.  The Parliament split along ethnic lines and rejected the reforms.100  
Additionally, the executive and legislative branches are very inefficient.  According to an 
analysis conducted by the nongovernmental organization the Center for Civilian Initiative, in 
2008, the Bosnia and Herzegovina Parliament adopted only 41 laws out of 151 planned.  Of 
those laws passed, only two were new, the others being simply amendments to existing laws.  
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A similar situation is found with the Council of Ministers, where efficiency in adopting new 
laws is less than 50 percent.101  Describing the current situation, Ivica Cavar, the coordinator 
of the Center for Civilian Initiative monitoring team for the Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Parliamentary Assembly, says, 
In two years of its work, the BiH Parliament adopted 81 laws.  During that 
time, the Croatian Parliament adopted an unbelievable 427 laws.  Also, the 
Parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina is delayed compared to the National 
Assembly of the Republic of Serbia.  Here we have a country that is a 
candidate for EU membership, and one which is in approximately 
comparable to Bosnia and Herzegovina, and again there can be seen the 
difference, as the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia adopted 53 
laws in the second half of last year.102 
Another example of the ineffectiveness of the Bosnia and Herzegovina 
administration is visible in the slow progress toward European Union membership.  To be 
accepted as an equal EU member, Bosnia and Herzegovina must fulfill some 
requirements; hence, the country is constantly monitored and evaluated.  Even though the 
entire political establishment states that their goal and the goal of their political parties is 
the integration of Bosnia and Herzegovina into the EU, progress has not meet 
expectations.  The report of the European Stability Initiative (ESI) for 2009 shows that 
Bosnia and Herzegovina has not met any necessary condition for a non-visas regime with 
the EU.  Actually, the country received the worst grades and shares the last spot on the 
bottom of the list.  One again the political elite has complicated an already complex 
situation and divided the population.  The country’s Croats and Serbs have special 
relations with Croatia and Serbia, respectively.  This means that most of them have dual 
citizenship and the possibility of holding passports from those countries.  Croatia is 
excluded from the Schengen103 restriction because of some pre-Schengen agreements, 
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which means that Croat passport holders have been allowed to travel all around Europe 
without visas.  Since the election of Borislav Tadic as president, Serbia has made serious 
progress toward EU membership.  Although Serbia is still off the Schengen list, it is 
likely that the visa regime for Serbian passport holders will be removed.  If the EU 
accepts Serbia on the Schengen White List, only the Bosnia and Herzegovina Bosniaks 
would remain under the visa regime.  This situation could have a negative impact on the 
situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  If Bosniaks’ travel to European countries involves 
visa limitations, while Serbs and Croats are able to go wherever they please in Europe, 
Bosniaks may easily feel frustrated, humiliated and unequal.  Facing closed doors in 
Europe, the Bosniaks might intensify relations with Middle Eastern countries like they 
did at the beginning of the war.  All of this might lead to religious radicalization and 
deepening divisions between Muslims and non-Muslims in the country.104 
After adopting legislation for Bosnia and Herzegovina police reform, the 
country fulfilled the necessary requirements for the Stabilization and Association 
Agreement (SAA) with the European Union.  The SAA was signed in June 2008, and 
Bosnia and Herzegovina politicians accepted a series of conditions that need to be 
adopted with political consensus.  Since then, not much has been done to insure 
implementation.  By the end of September 2008, only 13 of more than 30 short-term 
requirements had been met.  “Regardless of nearly unanimous declared support for the 
process of integration with Europe, there was practically no further progress in this regard 
after the signing itself,” according to the UNDP 2008 Annual Report.105 
b. Corruption in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Corruption in Bosnia and Herzegovina has been slowing down the 
reconstruction process.  Research shows that “despite some improvement in the 
environment for doing business, BiH is falling behind other countries in the region, 
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which are reforming much faster.”106  So far, three anti-corruption strategies have failed 
because of a lack of commitment from local institutions, lack of co-operation between the 






































































































































Europe - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
2004 BiH 4.3 4.1 3.9 4.0 3.3 3.8 4.0 3.8 3.1 3.5 2.7 3.1 2.3 2.5 2.5 
CE 4.0 3.9 4.0 3.9 3.5 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.2 3.5 2.9 3.4 3.1 2.7 2.3 
2005 BiH 4.5 4.2 4.0 4.1 3.5 3.8 3.9 3.9 3.1 3.6 2.5 2.9 2.4 2.3 2.6 
SE Europe 3.8 3.7 3.9 3.9 3.9 3.9 - 4.1 3.6 3.8 3.7 3.7 3.2 3.5 3.2 
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Figure 2. Impact of corruption on various sectors and institutions109 (lower is 
better) 
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The information provided by Transparency International shows that the 
impact of corruption on various sectors and institutions has been increasing during the 
last five years, which might be related to the intensified political situation during this 
period.  In addition, 71 percent of the Bosnia and Herzegovina population believes that 
the Bosnia and Herzegovina government actions in the fight against corruption have been 
ineffective, far above the average for other Balkan countries.110 
c. Economic Instability 
Bosnia and Herzegovina’s economic capabilities were significantly 
damaged during the war.  After the war, the economy was reorganized and transformed 
from a centrally planned economy to a market economy.  The process of reorganization is 
ongoing and the country still has not reached its pre-war level of economic development.  
In 2007, the official data shows that the economy recovered about 70 percent of the 
prewar GDP.  According to Divjak and Plug, this data is misleading because the prewar 
GDP level was calculated without considering the service sector, which was included in 
the calculations starting in 2007.  Therefore, the real economic recovery compared to the 
prewar GDP level is below 60 percent.111 
The first step of the reorganization was privatization of common property.  
This process has not been as successful as expected.  The total sales value of the 
enterprise was about six billion U.S. dollars, and privatization provided back only 400 
million.  In addition, many privatized companies have not rebuilt their production 
capabilities, resulting in increased unemployment.112  According to Agency for Statistics 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the country’s unemployment rate for 2008 was 23.4 
percent.113 
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The Political Instability Index shows that Bosnia and Herzegovina belongs 
to the group of countries where social protest poses a very high risk to government.  Out 
of 165 countries, Bosnia and Herzegovina was at 27th position in 2007, with a trend 
toward increasing risk.114 
 
Figure 3. Economic Stability Index (higher is better) 
According to UNDP, economic stability in Bosnia and Herzegovina, after 
initial increases from 1999 to 2002, has fluctuated considerably since then, with a 
negative trend that might continue.115 
d. Judicial Institutions 
Judicial reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina is ongoing. According to some 
analysts, as of 2008 there was still no rule of law, and national politics still have a 
significant influence on the judicial system.  “Positive shifts are rare, and are related 
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mainly to the prosecution of war crimes,” reported Deutsche Welle on June 28, 2008.116  
The judges and prosecutors in judicial institutions are mostly Bosnia and Herzegovina 
citizens but international staff helps local efforts to establish independent and efficient 
systems.  Patrick Robinson, President of the International Criminal Tribunal for Former 
Yugoslavia, says that international judges and prosecutors are still needed in the judicial 
institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and that their appointments should be 
extended.117 
According to Transparency International, Bosnia and Herzegovina have 
not conducted any specific measures to reduce the corruption level.  The organization 
points to political corruption, close relations between politicians and organized crime, 
illegal processes during privatization and lack of transparency in the work of public 
institutions as the biggest obstacles to progress.  The situation is based in disagreements 
over laws that regulate conflicts of interest, poor implementation of laws on freedom of 
access to private information, and the lack of an independent anticorruption body.118 
Even though the work of judicial institutions has not been seen as 
politically influenced, the choice of personnel for appointments is mostly a political 
process in which political eligibility prevails over individual competency.  Recent 
research by the Center for Investigative Journalism shows that three of nine Supreme 
Court judge appointments were politically motivated and that those selected had inferior 
professional qualifications compared to the nominees who were not chosen.  The same 
study discovered that the efficiency of the Supreme Court is low, with the court’s 
processes taking, on average, more than a year to complete.119 
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C. SUPPORT FOR RADICAL ELEMENTS 
1. Islamic Radicals in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Islamist ideas have been present in the Balkans since first half of the nineteenth 
century.  A group of young Muslims, motivated by the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, 
established an organization aiming to create a Muslim society aligned with Muslims 
worldwide.  The Young Muslims organization was established in Sarajevo in 1941.  
During World War II, many members of the organization collaborated with the Nazis.  
After the war, the Young Muslims continued to work in Yugoslavia promoting Pan-
Islamism and calling for jihad through the journal El-Mudzahid.  The editor of the 
journal, 21-year-old Young Muslim activist Alija Izetbegovic, was arrested shortly after 
the journal was published.  Izetbegovic received three year prison sentence for his 
wartime activities.  After prison, Izetbegovic operated secretly as a leader of the Young 
Muslims in Sarajevo.  Over time, the organization returned to its original strength and 
established secret ties with Islamists from Egypt and other Arab countries.120 
Izetbegovic wrote the Islamic Declaration, a manifesto of Islamists in Yugoslavia, 
in 1970.  The Declaration was not published at that time, but was secretly distributed 
among sympathizers and those of like mind.  The Islamic Declaration is a critical analysis 
of the position of Muslims in the world order; it sees Muslims as members of a single 
community that controls the most valuable resources while living in very divided and 
poor societies.  The general idea of the Declaration is “implementation of Islam in every 
sphere of the individual’s personal life, family and society, through revival of Islamic 
religious thought and creation of a common Islamic community from Morocco to 
Indonesia.”121 
Izetbegovic, together with other Muslim intellectuals, was again arrested in 1983 
and accused of terrorist activities and collaboration with Iran, at the time an enemy of 
Yugoslavia.  The end of the 1980s has been characterized as the beginning of the end of 
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the communist regime in Yugoslavia.  In 1988, the presidency released all political 
prisoners.  Izetbegovic was set free after only five years of prison.  Just a year later, 
Izetbegovic and Adil Zulfikarpasihch, an emigrant to Switzerland, formed a Bosniak 
political party called the Party of Democratic Actions (SDA).  Because there was no 
strong state system, Izetbegovic was free to put his radical ideas in motion.  In 1990, he 
finally published his 20 year-old Islamic Declaration.  Obviously, Izetbegovic has held a 
radical Islamist ideology since his early attempts to establish an Islamic country based on 
Quran and Shari’a through the SDA.122  However, his ideology was never openly 
promoted through the party’s program.  For Bosnia and Herzegovina’s moderate Muslims 
and multiethnic population, a party with an Islamist agenda would not be acceptable.  
Therefore, Izetbegovic and his narrow political leadership carefully manipulated the 
masses, promoting democratic values.  In 1990, Izetbegovic became the first president of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina.  To achieve his hidden agenda, Izetbegovic and the SDA elites 
needed support; hence, they restored their links first with Iran and later with other Islamic 
countries of the Middle East.  This triggered the arrival of new elements who started 
shaping Bosniak’s national consciousness and identity.  Some of these elements with 
extremist agendas jeopardize Bosnia and Herzegovina’s multiethnic society and moderate 
Muslims even today. 
2. Support from the Political and Religious Elite 
Izetbegovica was not the only politician who supported Islamizing Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.  Almost all of his close associates were carefully chosen and almost all of 
them share the same ideology.  Those who opposed Islamizing Bosnia and Herzegovina 
left the party, as Zulfikarpasic did in 1992 after realizing the real nature of Izetbegovic’s 
efforts.  In October 2008, Dzevad Galiasevic, a politician and member of an independent 
expert group on counterterrorism, stated that about 400 persons tied to the terrorist 
network live in Bosnia and Herzegovina under the protection of Muslim politicians and 
other powerful people in the country. 
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I identified their political protectors such as Haris Silajdzic, Hasan Cengic, 
Alija Izetbegovic, and Bakir Izetbegovic, as well as their protectors in the 
police such as Semsudin Mehmedovic, who is currently the deputy 
chairman of the committee overseeing SIPA and police reform expert,” 
says Galijasevic in the interview for Croatian daily Vecernji List.123 
In much of the literature, the name of Hasan Cengic is tied to Islamic radicalism 
and Islamic countries in the Middle East.  Cengic was Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Minister 
of Defense before he was replaced at the request of the international community.  Some 
sources say that Cengic was involved in weapons supply to southern Serbia and Kosovo 
during the Kosovo crisis.124 
Bakir Izebegovic, the son of Alija Izetbegovic, has been tied to the donation of 
land in Sarajevo to Saudi Arabia, where the Saudis then built the King Fahd mosque and 
recreational center.  Reportedly, the land belonged to the Serb Orthodox Church before it 
was nationalized by former regime.  The mosque and recreation center are not under the 
jurisdiction of the Bosnia and Herzegovina Islamic community, nor are Bosnia and 
Herzegovina authorities allowed to approach to the property without the permission of 
the mosque leadership.  The mosque is known as a gathering place for Islamic radicals. 
Semsudin Mehmetovic was the chief law enforcement officer in the Zenica region 
during 1996.  At the time, diplomats, NATO officers and the United Nations saw him and 
his negative attitude toward ethnic minorities as a serious threat to peace.  Indeed, he was 
accused of “having sheltered foreign Islamic fundamentalist fighters, of crushing 
moderate Muslim political forces and of fostering hatred between Muslims and 
Croats.”125 
Finally, Haris Silajdzic, the Bosniak member of the Bosnia and Herzegovina 
presidency, was among Izetbegovic’s core staff.  During the war, Silajdzic was the 
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second man in the Party for Democratic Action.  Actually, he was Izebegovic’s deputy, 
and one of the persons directly involved in importing foreign fighters in the country.  
Silajdzic has good relations with Islamic states, and when he was elected as a member of 
the Bosnia and Herzegovina Presidency, the Iranian government expressed pleasure at his 
election and promised to continue supporting Bosnia and Herzegovina.126  Haris Silajdzic 
was the driving force on behalf of not only the governments of Islamic countries but also 
Islamic movements and humanitarian organizations.127 
These politicians are not the only ones supportive of Islamic ideology, but they 
definitely represent the top of the Bosniak political elite.  This leads to the conclusion that 
among Bosniak politicians there is strong current support for the creation of an Islamic 
state of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the creation of a Bosniak-dominated state. 
While the Bosnia and Herzegovina Islamic community, headed by Reis Ceric, has 
expressed skepticism toward Islamic radicals and their activities in the country, they 
never openly tried to prevent the spread of radical ideology.  Indeed, the Islamic 
community seems to provide a permissive environment for the spread of radical Islam 
with aid received from Saudi Arabia.  According to Dzevad Galiasevic, there is ongoing 
recruitment of new terrorists in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and some mosques serve as 
recruitment centers.  He named the King Fahd mosque in Sarajevo as an example.  He 
also claims that the Islamic community knows of these activities, and part of the 
community supports radicalization by allowing the practice of Wahhabism in some 
mosques.128 
3. Neglect by Bosnia and Herzegovina Institutions 
Support by some members of the Bosnia and Herzegovina political elite to the 
spread of Islamism throughout the country causes state institutions to ignore the issue.  
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For this reason, the results of the investigations conducted between 1993 and 2001 
regarding relations between terrorists and humanitarian organizations in the country have 
been ignored, marginalized or even covered up.  The first independent investigation on 
the relationship between terrorists and humanitarian organizations was conducted in 
2001, at the strong request of U.S. officials. 129 Basically, the results have not been 
published, and major suspects would disappear when they came under investigation or 
police surveillance.  Indeed, the radicalization of Bosniaks and the existence of Islamist 
and terrorist elements in the country are still avoidable topics among Bosnia and 
Herzegovina population and political leaders. 
The federal prison in Zenica is under strong Wahhabi influence.  In the past few 
years, there are dozens of reported incidents of non-Muslim prisoners’ forced conversion 
to Islam and beatings of Muslims who refuse to pray.  Some prisoners openly glorify 
Osama bin Laden and his fight against coalition forces in Afghanistan.  Bosnia and 
Herzegovina officials and even the media have ignored conditions in the Zenica prison.  
Initially, the Croat and Serb newspapers reported the incidents, which attracted more 
attention from Croats and Serbs than from Bosniaks.  There are reportedly 50 Wahhabis 
in the prison, including Muarmer Topalovic, an extremist who murdered three members 
of a Bosnia and Herzegovina Croat family in the village of Kostajnica in 2002.  Even 
though some prisoners are willing to testify to mistreatment, the director of the Zenica 
prison categorically denies all incidents and the existence of Islamic radicalism in the 
prison.130 
In July 2009, Karray Kamel bin Ali, known as Abu Mali, escaped from the same 
prison while serving three year and 10 month long sentence for robberies and physical 
injuries to members of the Kovac family from the village of Brnjice near Kakanj.  Karray 
did not actually escape the prison, but rather did not return from an approved leave.  
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Karray, of Tunisian origin, was among the Islamic foreign fighters awarded Bosnia and 
Herzegovina citizenship.  He married a Bosnian woman and remained in the country.  
Karray was a good friend of Jusuf Barcic.  Their friendship began while Karray was 
serving a previous seven-year sentence for a murder he committed in Zenica in 1997, and 
Barcic was serving a three-month sentence for abuse in the family.  In April 2007, the 
Ministry of Security identified Karray as a threat to national security, due to his ties with 
terrorist organizations, and canceled his citizenship.131  Although his temporary visa 
expired after six months, Karray was prosecuted and sentenced in November 2007.  
Several days later, he was seen walking through the town of Zenica.  The authorities let 
him walk free while he waited to begin serving his sentence.  Since March 2009, the 
same administration allowed him to take leaves “because of his appropriate behavior in 
prison.”132 
The Zenica prison provides just one of many examples of how radical elements 
and their supporters are ignored and marginalized by Bosnia and Herzegovina officials.  
Immediately after reports of Islamization in the prison, some Bosniaks connected the 
news to Milorad Dodig and the attempts of Bosnia and Herzegovina Serbs and Croats to 
close the federal prison in Zenica and establish national prisons in Mostar and Banjaluka. 
D. DEMOGRAPHIC AND GEOGRAPHIC FEATURES 
Bosnia and Herzegovina is a southeast European country in the western part of 
Balkan Peninsula.  Even though its seacoast is only 24 kilometers, it is a Mediterranean 
country as well.  Its location makes it a transit area from the European continent to the 
Mediterranean Sea, as well as from western Europe to southeast Europe and Asia.  
Kimberley Thachuk describes Bosnia and Herzegovina as “a regional hub for narcotics 
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transshipment.  It also serves as a transit country for drugs, humans, and cigarettes.”133  
Like smugglers, international terrorists can use the country to infiltrate European soil and 
to penetrate deeper into other European countries.  The country’s internal geography also 
plays an important role in attracting potential terrorist groups.  The terrain varies from the 
lowlands in the north to massive mountains in the south and central parts of the country.  
Although the infrastructure is quite developed, migrations during the war caused many 
remote villages to be abandoned.  Such rural areas are poorly controlled by local security 
elements and therefore suitable for the eventual establishment of various non-native 
communities, perhaps even terrorist camps. 
Another feature affecting the spread of Islamic terrorist networks is related to the 
Muslim population living in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  About 43 percent of the state 
population is Muslim.  Except for religion, Bosniaks do not differ in any way from other 
Europeans.  Bosniaks have the same physical appearance, social behavior, clothing, 
language and in some cases even names; they can fit perfectly into secular Europe.  
Generally, it is much easier for Islamic terrorists to spread their influence in societies 
where they can radicalize some of the local population and find supporters for their 
activities, therefore Bosnia and Herzegovina with its Muslim population seems to be 
attractive for terrorist to spread their influence. 
E. CONCLUSION 
Almost fifteen years after the war, Bosnia and Herzegovina is still not a stable 
country.  Constant confrontations and disunity among Bosnia and Herzegovina 
politicians representing different ethnic groups is serious obstacle to progress.  Because 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s social, political and economic situation, the Fund for Peace 
research places the country among those states vulnerable to failure.  Political disunity 
results in many inefficient and ineffective state institutions.  Negative impacts can be 
seen even in the security sector.  Recent events prove that the country cannot efficiently 
control its borders, resulting in trafficking, smuggling and illegal border crossings.  
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Poorly controlled borders, police forces that cannot effectively fight illegal elements and 
state security institutions unable to carry out their tasks all support the development of 
destabilizing elements, including elements supporting terrorism and Islamic radicalism.  
Steven Olujic states that, 
The inability of the state to effectively control its territory leaves a certain 
level of freedom for extremist elements to operate in the “ungoverned” 
spaces found mostly in the rugged terrain of central Bosnia.134 
Weaknesses of Bosnia and Herzegovina are not evident—only in its weak 
coercive abilities.  Ethnic tension and political disunity result in a slow and inefficient 
legislative and executive decision-making.  Politicians’ unwillingness to compromise 
makes the passage of new laws a long and sometimes seemingly endless process.  Weak 
legislative and law enforcement capabilities make the country fertile soil for all kinds of 
illegal and destabilizing elements.  It is no surprise that UNDP research shows that the 
impact of corruption on various sectors and institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina is 
greater than the European Union average in 2004 to 2007, and greater than the western 
Balkan average in 2008. 
Besides its weak coercive and administrative capacities, Bosnia and Herzegovina 
has one characteristic very important for attracting Islamist terrorists—the support of 
some Bosniak politicians for Islamic radical ideologies.  Even if no Bosniak politician 
publicly expresses sympathy and support for Islamic radicals, one can assume that those 
who supported Islamist ideologies before the war, were involved in importing foreign 
fighters and supported radicalization of the Bosniak population during the war, and 
protect foreign fighters since the end of the war, still supports Islamic radical activities 
and use Bosnia and Herzegovina’s complicated and inefficient security system to protect 
them. 
In summary, constant confrontations among Bosnia and Herzegovina politicians 
erode state institutions and the mechanisms for providing citizens with basic goods.  The 
state cannot control its territory or borders, corruption is rampant, bureaucracy is slow 
and ineffective, the economy is unstable, and the rule of law is not established.  With 
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political elements that support radical ideologies, Bosnia and Herzegovina can be seen as 
a sympathetic space for terrorist vanguards to establish bases and recruit followers. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Three theories that define the roots and necessary conditions for development of 
or support to terrorist networks and the radicalization of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s 
Muslim society result in different outcomes.  The theory of political grievances is not 
applicable to the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but its failure does not mean that the 
Bosniak population is satisfied with the current situation in the country and the Muslim 
world.  On the contrary, Bosniaks are not indifferent toward events in the Middle East 
and especially toward the slow and inefficient return process and post conflict justice in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina.  However, Bosnia and Herzegovina’s democratic system is 
based on political pluralism and encourages political participation, and the population can 
express grievances through political institutions or by supporting existing political parties 
or establishing new ones.  Therefore, dissatisfied Bosniaks opt for political participation 
and nonviolence in bringing their grievances to the attention of responsible authorities, 
instead of insurgent violence. 
Vanguards of politically motivated extremist groups either do not exist in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina or their existence is weak and unimportant.  This is not the case for 
vanguards of religiously motivated extremist groups.  Islamic radical fighters initially 
came to support the Bosniaks during the 1992–1995 war.  After the war, those who 
remained in country continued operating, mostly in religious circles, attempting to 
alienate Bosniaks from their traditional Islamic practices and impose a more strict and 
puritanical form of Islam.  Although they did not radicalize the entire Muslim population, 
they attracted some followers among Muslim youth. 
The Islamist current known in the West as Wahhabism was unknown in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina before it was brought by the Mujahideen in the early 1990s and by 
Bosnia and Herzegovina Muslims who attended Saudi sponsored Islamic universities in 
the Middle East.  In less than fifteen years, the number of Wahhabi followers increased to 
more than 6000 Bosniaks.  The majority of them advocates a nonviolent approach to 
achieving their objectives and operates within legal boundaries, so they cannot be 
accused of breaking the law or their activities banned.  Some radicalized Bosniaks 
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already act as vanguards of Islamist terrorist networks promoting anti-Western and anti-
secular ideologies, demonizing the United States, and calling for jihad in support of 
Muslims in the Middle East.  Numerous Web sites promote puritanical Islam and attempt 
to radicalize Bosniaks to accept violence as a way of expressing their beliefs and 
achieving their goals.  They try to keep the Bosniak population alienated and encourage 
constant animosity towards Serbs, Croats and non-Muslim societies.  Their objectives for 
Bosnia and Herzegovina include spreading Islamist influence within Europe, mobilizing 
the Bosniak population as a part of the global Islamic community, and creating an 
environment where terrorist organizations can mobilize new members for further 
activities. 
The growth of Islamic radical ideologies among Bosnia and Herzegovina’s 
Bosniaks would not be possible without strong foreign sponsorship and the approval of 
local authorities.  Middle Eastern Islamist influences, welcomed by some Bosnia and 
Herzegovina political and religious leaders, have shaped the environment of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina for almost two decades.  Dozens of Middle Eastern style new mosques were 
built by Saudi donations, along with several religious schools and universities where 
classes are taught in the Arabic language.  These mosques are mostly used as assembly 
points for Islamists and centers where the previously unknown puritanical style of Islam 
is openly promoted.  These Islamist activities would not be possible without the 
acquiescence of local authorities, whose support for radicalization of Muslim society and 
Islamic terrorists is evident in their provision of new identities, travel documents and 
hideouts for Islamic foreign fighters who supported the Bosniaks during the war and 
remained in the country after the war ended.  Some of the officials involved in importing 
Mujahideen and supporting various Middle Eastern organizations still play important 
public roles as politicians, businessmen, religious leaders and university professors.  With 
all these people operating in the public sphere, and weak coercive and administrative 
capacities caused by constant confrontations between politicians, the country seems to be 
fertile ground for Islamist extremism. 
Petter Nesser provides a chronology of attempted and executed terrorist attacks by 
violent Islamist radicals in Europe between 1994 and 2007.  In 74 incidents, more than 
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250 people were killed and many thousands affected.  However, in all these incidents, 
only two Bosniaks were involved, in two separate cases.  Both cases are classified135 by 
Nesser as  
incidents of a more dubious character, in which information about 
suspected terrorists, targets, and intentions is vaguer, and which the author 
has not yet been able to verify or adequately substantiate through 
independent sources.136 
In addition, “[a]n opinion poll found 70 percent of Bosnian Muslims opposed 
Wahhabism, while 13 percent broadly supported it.  Only 3 percent declared themselves 
followers.”137  Even though Bosnia and Herzegovina has a permissive environment for 
establishing and supporting Islamist extremist groups and some radicalized Bosniaks act 
as vanguards of global terrorist networks, most Bosnia and Herzegovina Bosniaks are not 
so radicalized that they would set up a branch of an existing terrorist network or create 
their own group, nor would they provide significant support to the global terrorist 
network.  Existing Islamic radicals are still not seen as a threat for Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and regional security, nor does Bosnia and Herzegovina play an important 
role in supporting global terrorism. 
A. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Islamic radicals have failed to establish a significant presence in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina despite the country’s permissive environment.  The most probable reason 
for their failure lies in Bosnia and Herzegovina Muslim population, who generally seem 
unsupportive of radical ideologies that are historically or culturally foreign to their 
tradition.  Therefore, exploring why the Bosnia and Herzegovina Muslim population 
seems unsupportive of radical Islamic ideologies is a good starting place for further 
research.  Answers may include the fact that the majority of the country’s Muslim 
population shares a common way of life with Christians in a centuries-old secular society.  
Further, Bosniaks were less connected to and informed about trends in the Muslim world 
                                                 
135 Nesser, “Chronology of Jihadism in Western Europe 1994–2007.” 
136 Ibid., 926. 
137 Sito-Sucic. 
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in highly secular Yugoslavia; hence, they were spared negative influences from the 
Islamic world.  In addition, the Bosnia and Herzegovina Muslim population practices 
traditional Islam influenced by Sufism, which is a doctrine more supportive of secularism 
than Islamic radical ideologies; thus Bosnia and Herzegovina Muslims resist 
radicalization and the association of their own fight with the global war against enemies 
of Islam.138  Finally, a secular multiethnic environment with guaranteed equal rights and 
high literacy rates can also contribute to the failure of radicalism in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. 
1. Common Way of Life 
Islam came to Bosnia and Herzegovina with the Turkish invasion in the fifteenth 
century.  Upon their arrival, the Turks started converting the local population to Islam, a 
process that continued throughout most of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and was 
never entirely completed.  Not all of the local population was converted, and those who 
were converted did not immediately accept the new religion in their hearts.  Whether 
converted voluntarily or forcibly, people generally accepted the new religion just to 
protect their own interests and to gain benefits such as higher social status.  In many 
cases, families were divided between converts to Islam and those who remained loyal to 
their old religion.  Some converts practiced Islam in public and their own religion 
secretly.  People did not forget old habits and customs overnight.  However, Islam 
eventually became the generally accepted and practiced religion in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.  The moderate Islam practiced in Bosnia and Herzegovina has been shaped 
by long coexistence with other faiths.  It incorporates customs that predate Christian 
Slavs’ conversion to Islam in the fifteenth century when the Ottomans conquered the 
Balkans.  Therefore, moderate Muslims, accustomed to religious pluralism, are not eager 
to accept radical ideologies that are less open to a common life shared with people of 
other religions. 
                                                 
138 Cook, 135. 
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2. Equal Rights 
The socialist regime of the former Yugoslavia may be an important factor in 
shaping Muslims’ religious behavior and customs.  Before World War II, the legal 
system of Bosnia and Herzegovina was based on Shari’a law.  After the war and the 
victory of Tito’s partisans, Islam and other religions were drastically limited and their 
role and importance was minimized.  The state became highly secular.  Practicing 
religion became a free choice, but the practicing was allowed only during free time and in 
private or dedicated locations and objects. 
From the beginning, the communists promoted equal rights among women and 
men.  Equal rights and civil law replaced the male dominant society and Shari’a law.  
The regime prohibited gender discrimination, and women started playing an important 
role in political, educational, social and other spheres of Yugoslav society.  Once women 
reach gender equality, it is very hard for them to accept subordinate positions in society.  
There are many examples in the puritan interpretation of the Islamic text that put women 
in inferior positions to men.  This view is not supported by Bosniak females, and 
contributes to animosity towards radical ideologies among Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Muslims in general. 
3. Literacy and Moderate Religious Education 
Another characteristic of the prewar period that influences the behavior of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina Muslims is high levels of literacy.  Basic education is mandatory for 
everyone, and as a result, the literacy rate in Bosnia and Herzegovina is 96.7 percent.  
Some scholars argue that education does not influence the decision to become a terrorist, 
citing many examples of highly educated terrorists.  However, an educated society does 
not involve only the male population.  Education for women opens the door to political 
participation and creates alternatives and approaches to problem solving that do not 
usually include extremism and insurgent violence.  Islamist ideologies do not support 
women in political roles and as social leaders.  As a result, educated women are less 
likely to see Islamist societies as an option where they can participate equally in public 
life. 
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The religious education offered through the educational institutions of the Bosnia 
and Herzegovina Islamic community is one more reason why Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Muslims practice moderate Islam.  There are eight medresas in the country. The oldest is 
Gazi Husrev Begova Medresa, founded in 1537.  The educational model of this medresa 
and that of similar schools in the country includes study of traditional and rationalized 
doctrine that allows students to gain theological, philosophical, legal, philological and 
scientific knowledge.  Beside the mandatory religious courses, students take general 
courses with linguistic, mathematical and social content. These courses include Bosnian, 
Arabic and English languages, mathematics, physics, chemistry, biology, history, 
sociology, democracy and human rights, philosophy, psychology, pedagogy and sports.  
This curriculum gives medresa graduates the chance to continue their education in one of 
the three Islamic universities in Sarajevo, Zenica and Bihac, or in any other university in 
the country or abroad, depending on their interests and inclination.139  The teachings in 
these religious schools are based on traditional and moderate Islam, giving graduates the 
education necessary to oppose Islamic fundamentalism and motivating them to remain 
faithful to traditional Islam. 
4. Common Motherland 
Finally, sharing a common motherland also can be seen as a reason why Bosnia 
and Herzegovina Muslims do not support radical ideologies.  Bosniaks have lived with 
Christians and other religious groups for centuries.  They did not migrate to Bosnia and 
Herzegovina; they occupied the region before the arrival of Islam and Christianity.  Even 
though the Ottomans had a big influence on Bosniak culture and religious beliefs, 
Bosniaks have never been totally alienated from other local ethnic groups.  Even today, 
Bosniaks are more similar to Bosnia and Herzegovina Serbs and Croats than to the Turks 
with whom they share a religion.  Bosniaks have always considered Bosnia and 
Herzegovina to be their only motherland, the home of their distant ancestors and their 
descendants. 
                                                 
139 Gazi Husrev-Begova Medresa, home page, http://www.medresa.ba/index.html (accessed June 5, 
2009). 
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During the last half century, Bosniaks have enjoyed a lifestyle more like the 
western European countries than the Islamic countries in the Middle East and North 
Africa.  The majority of Bosniaks sees Bosnia and Herzegovina as a European 
democratic country and knows that Bosnia and Herzegovina can become wealthy only as 
a part of modern Europe.  Therefore, Bosniaks oppose elements who would like to 
transform Bosnia and Herzegovina into a state that would not fit into modern democratic 
surroundings.  Bosniaks are aware that any radicalization of their society can negatively 
influence their common life with Serbs and Croats and jeopardize the country’s stability 
and economic prosperity. 
B. AMBIGUITIES AND UNANSWERED QUESTIONS  
The arrival of the Mujahideen in the early 1990s would not have been possible 
without both the help of other countries with access to Bosnia and Herzegovina’s 
territory across the land border or by air, and the approval of the international 
community.  Many scholars describe Croatia as important for the import of the 
Mujahideen.  Some say that during the war, there were many “night flights” supplying 
Bosnia and Herzegovina Muslims.  Croat involvement is open to question and should be 
addressed.  The extent to which the international community supported global terrorist 
networks is still unclear.  Al-Qaeda and its network have existed since the late 1980s, and 
it is quite unbelievable that United Nations and the western countries were unaware of its 
spread to Bosnia and Herzegovina.  At the beginning of the war in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, UN peacekeepers were already deployed to the area, and NATO started 
controlling Bosnia and Herzegovina air space in 1993.  With these assets on the ground, 
the international community should have known what was happening.  There is also the 
question why the UN, with strong U.S. support, imposed an arms embargo on all former 
Yugoslavian republics early in the war, without preventing the conflict and Serb 
domination, and why the U.S. administration later started secretly supporting the arming 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina Muslims, thus playing both sides of the fence.  On the one 
hand, the U.S. administration blamed Iran for supporting Hezbollah in Lebanon, referring 
to Iran as the main source of terrorism.  On the other hand, the same administration 
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allowed the shipping of weapons along with Iranian intelligence agents and Mujahideen 
into Bosnia and Herzegovina.140  Was Bosnia and Herzegovina, for the U.S., a mistake 
similar to the one they made in Afghanistan by supporting the Mujahideen during the 
Soviet-Afghan war? 
C. CLARIFICATION OF SOME MISCONCEPTIONS 
Prior any further research, some common misconceptions about Bosnia and 
Herzegovina Muslims should be clarified.  Bosniaks are often referred to as Western 
oriented by foreign journalists, diplomats and representatives of the international 
community, because they rarely practice their religion and enjoy alcoholic beverages and 
smoking as typical Europeans do.  Although nothing negative is meant by this 
characterization of Bosniaks, moderate Muslims respond negatively, and some become 
stricter in their religious practice and may even become unintentionally radicalized.  
Describing a Muslim as Western only because he or she drinks alcohol and smokes is 
nothing more than a scornful characterization and a mistaken approach to building a 
multiethnic and multi-religious society.  Bosnia and Herzegovina Muslims do not need 
proof that they belong to Europe; they have been living in Europe for centuries.  Their 
tolerance of other religions and readiness to accept everything good for their country’s 
progress as an independent secular country makes them unique in Islamic world. 
Sacir Filandra, Professor at the University of Political Science in Sarajevo, says in 
an interview with the independent magazine Dani,  
I see Bosniak policy as the application of European political standards, a 
clear pro-European orientation, long-term work on improving and 
qualitative strengthening of state institutions, education, health, ordering 
of relations within Bosnia with the Serbs and Croats.141 
                                                 
140Arms Embargo in Bosnia (House of Representatives–April 25, 1996), GlobalSecurity.org, 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/1996_cr/h960425a.htm (accessed June 27, 2009). 
141 Eldin Hadzovic, “Tihic je okruzen ispodprosjecnim provincijalcima,” BHdani.com, May 29,2009, 
http://www.bhdani.com/default.asp?kat=txt&broj_id=624&tekst_rb=4 (accessed June 14, 2009). 
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The majority of the Muslim population supported the secular state structure of the 
former Yugoslavia, and despite the fact that many of them are very strict believers, a 
large number still agree that Bosnia and Herzegovina should be highly secular. 
D. FIGHTING FOR A BETTER FUTURE 
 Despite Bosniaks’ suffering and casualties in the recent ethnic war, they are 
willing to move on and continue to live in the same society with Croats and Serbs.  The 
multi-ethnic state can help moderate Muslims by opposing and minimizing radicalization.  
The radicalization of the Muslim population is the issue influencing all ethnic groups 
living in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  Actually, it is a serious obstacle to progress.  Only 
Muslims can resolve this issue, and any attempt by other groups would create even more 
issues that could be used by Islamic radicals to recruit new members.  However, there are 
some basic requirements and adjustments that should be addressed by all three groups.  
First, the Bosniak political elite should stop seeing Bosnia and Herzegovina as a country 
dominated by its Muslim population.  Even though Bosniaks represent a majority of the 
Bosnia and Herzegovina population, they are just one of three constitutive nations 
involved in creating a single society where each nation has equal representation.  Second, 
Bosniaks should develop a clear strategy for their future in light of the cultural and 
religious differences between them and non-Muslims.  Practicing the strict and 
puritanical interpretation of Islam is acceptable as long as it does not interfere with 
democratic values and the secular political structure.  Bosnia and Herzegovina officials, 
both political and religious, should face reality and act accordingly.  On the other side, 
the non-Muslim Croats and Serbs should be aware that their country is all of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, not only the parts where they are in the majority.  Once all three ethnic 
groups become aware of the necessity of living together in a multiethnic society where all 
sides will find their own interests satisfied, the space for destabilizing elements will be 
minimized.  The threshold of tolerance and mutual understanding must be very high in 
order to provide a better future for everybody in the country.  Bosnia and Herzegovina’s 
future depends exclusively on the willingness of local politicians to build a stable and self 
sustaining country that can challenge radical Islamists and their ideologies.
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